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EVOLUTION, CHILD ABUSE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Christopher Marlborough* 
INTRODUCTION 
The presence of a non-genetic parent in a child’s home is the 
largest single risk factor for severe child maltreatment yet 
discovered.1 Professor Owen Jones has used the example of 
stepparent infanticide to explain how evolutionary analysis in law 
can serve society’s goals when prevailing theories have failed.2 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., State University of New 
York at Purchase, 1991. I would like to thank Professors Jennifer Rosato and 
Bailey Kuklin for their input and guidance in writing this note and my lovely 
wife Jennifer for her infinite patience. 
1 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA: A 
DARWINIAN VIEW OF PARENTAL LOVE 7 (1998) [hereinafter DALY & WILSON, 
CINDERELLA]. 
2 Owen Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Jones, 
Child Abuse]. Professor Jones suggests a four-stage process to determine when 
evolutionary principles can be helpful to inform legal policy. Id. at 1158. 
First, “[t]he Identification Stage frames the subject to analyze it. It clarifies 
one’s legal goal with respect to a law-relevant of human behavior and assesses 
the likelihood that evolutionary analysis can aid in the pursuit of that goal.” 
Id. at 1157-58. Second, “[t]he Information Stage uncovers and organizes new 
information on the multiple causes of the defined behavior. It describes how 
one can explore evolutionary theories, examine the evidence bearing on their 
falsifiable predictions, and assess the fit between the theory and the available 
evidence.” Id. at 1158. Third, “[t]he Integration Stage describes how to 
expose true conflicts between evolutionary and prevailing theories and how to 
integrate the best parts of each into a comprehensive understanding of the 
behavior, generate new legal strategies for pursuing pre-articulated legal 
goals, improve the cost-benefit analyses that often drive various legal policies, 
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Specifically, Jones has made a compelling case for the 
consideration of evolutionary theories in legal policies relating to 
child abuse and has brought some startling facts to the attention 
of the legal community.3 Children living with one genetic parent 
and one non-genetic parent are up to one hundred times more 
likely to suffer fatal abuse than those living with two genetic 
parents.4 While one might think this enormous disparity would 
inspire lawmakers to address the problem head on, thus far they 
have not. The implementation of laws targeting non-genetic 
parents presents unique moral and ethical conflicts to legislators 
who largely rely on the social science community for scientific 
information.5 Research that has lead to the discovery of 
differential abuse rates among non-biological parents, however, 
did not arise from the traditional social sciences, but from the 
field of evolutionary psychology.6 Unfortunately, the social 
                                                          
and provide new directions for future research initiatives.” Id. Finally, “[t]he 
Application Stage applies the information generated by the previous stages to 
effect concrete improvements in the legal system.” Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 28. 
5 Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality and the 
Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2072 (2000). Jones notes that 
lawmakers have traditionally looked to philosophy for moral guidance and to 
sociology for information on norms. Id. “To the extent that legal thinkers have 
in fact begun to move beyond philosophy and sociology for more information, 
they have turned primarily to economics, psychology and game theory.” Id. at 
2073. Nevertheless, “[a]s consumers and appliers of knowledge from other 
disciplines, legal thinkers should play—indeed should feel obligated to play—
far more active role in furthering interdisciplinary integration of subjects 
relevant to law.” Id. at 2073. Jones points out that behavioral biology has at 
least as much to offer to the study of norms as these other disciplines and that 
by ignoring contributions from this field of inquiry, legal thinkers risk errors 
that are both intellectually embarrassing and harmful. Id. 
6 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 21. Evolutionary 
psychology is the scientific study of the effects of the human biological 
evolutionary history on modern day human behavior. See STEPHEN PINKER, 
HOW THE MIND WORKS 23 (1997) [hereinafter PINKER, MIND WORKS]. It is 
an interdisciplinary science, which gathers evidence from numerous other 
disciplines, including biology, paleontology, ethology, anthropology, 
sociology, economics, cognitive psychology and linguistics in order to make 
predictions about human behavior. See EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: 
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science and academic communities have gone beyond a healthy 
skepticism and have displayed unprecedented hostility to 
evolutionary explanations for human behavior.7 Much of this 
criticism is unwarranted and comes from people who should 
know better, based on their training and expertise.8 As 
                                                          
THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 10 (1997) [hereinafter WILSON, CONSILIENCE]. 
Therefore, a common understanding of the world among the various 
disciplines is critical to the success of evolutionary psychology. Id. A more 
general term, “sociobiology” is the study of the evolutionary history of animal 
behavior, including humans. Id. at 150. 
7 See, e.g., PINKER, MIND WORKS, supra note 6, at 45. “The biologist 
E.O. Wilson was doused with a pitcher of water at a scientific convention and 
students yelled for his dismissal over bullhorns and put up posters urging 
people to bring noisemakers to his lectures.” Id. 
8 STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN 
NATURE 108-09 (2002) [hereinafter PINKER, BLANK SLATE]. Scholars have 
suggested a variety of reasons evolutionary psychology has had difficulty 
gaining acceptance in the social science community. Id. First, evolutionary 
psychology is often inappropriately compared with the social Darwinist and 
the eugenics movements. Id. at 109. For a comprehensive discussion of the 
history of social Darwinism, see DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF 
EUGENICS (1985). Social Darwinism referred to class stratification within 
society, postulating that people are socially disadvantaged because of their 
genetic inferiority, which had left them unable to compete with those in the 
upper classes. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 396 (2d 
ed. 1996). The eugenics movements went one step further and attempted to 
improve the human race by giving the “more suitable races” an upper hand in 
the survival of the fittest. See KEVLES, supra, at ix. At one time, evolutionary 
explanations for human behavior were widely accepted among the intellectual 
community in this country, with results that are repugnant by today’s 
standards. See PINKER, MIND WORKS, supra note 6, at 47. The eugenics 
agenda has been used to assert the supremacy of the Aryan race and to support 
the mandatory sterilization of convicts and the disabled. Id. 
 Second, critics of evolutionary psychology suggest that biological 
considerations of human behavior will lead to inappropriate ethical and moral 
conclusions, such as biological determinism and conflicts with the concept of 
free will. See generally DANIEL C. DENNETT, FREEDOM EVOLVES (2003) 
(arguing that biological determinism and free will are compatible); see also, 
PINKER, BLANK SLATE, supra, at 174 -79 (arguing that free will is 
unnecessary to preserve personal responsibility for our actions ). One such 
moral conclusion was a key flaw in social Darwinist thought. DANIEL C. 
DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF 
MARLBOROUGHMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:10 PM 
690 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
                                                          
LIFE 467-68 (1995) (hereinafter DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA). 
Social Darwinists were misguided by what has been termed the “the naturalist 
fallacy,” confusing the reality of “what is” from the moral and ethical 
judgments of what “ought to be.” PINKER, BLANK SLATE, supra, at 150. 
Some have asserted that evolutionary psychology presents a similar moral 
threat. Id. Even Susan Blaffer Hrdy, a leading sociobiologist and the 
originator of the sexual selection hypothesis of infanticide discussed in this 
note, has questioned whether sociobiology should be taught at the high school 
or even undergraduate level. PINKER, MIND WORKS, supra note 6, at 47. 
Hrdy suggests, “[U]nless a student already has a moral framework in place, 
we could be creating social monsters by teaching this.” Id. at 45. In fact, if 
evolutionary psychologists promoted biological determinism in its strictest 
form, there would be no impetus for them to seek change in social policy at 
all. Social policy would be irrelevant to the issue of stepparents biologically 
determined to abuse the stepchildren. See PINKER, BLANK SLATE, supra, at 
177. The nature versus nurture dichotomy is not the “winner take all” battle of 
the century as it is often portrayed. HENRY PLOTKIN, DARWIN MACHINES AND 
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE 164 (1993). Nevertheless, there is legitimate 
debate over the relative influence of each. See PINKER, BLANK SLATE, supra, 
at vii-x, 35. The answers to this inquiry come from culture’s most accurate 
method for finding the truth, science. WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 6, at 
45. Evolutionary psychologists argue that biology is just as important as 
culture; while biology imposes constraints on behavior, all behavior results 
from the interaction of biology and culture. Steven Pinker, Language is a 
Human Instinct, in THE THIRD CULTURE: BEYOND THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION 223, 234 (John Brockman ed. 1995) (tracing the idea of the mind 
as a blank slate to the 1920s, when it arose as a politically motivated reaction 
to the social Darwinist and eugenics movements). Pinker contends that this 
idea was strongly supported by now discredited theories in anthropology and 
psychology. Id. Anthropologists claimed that nothing could be said about the 
human species because cultures vary without limit, while psychology 
contributed the idea of the mind as a “general all-purpose learning 
mechanism.” Id. 
 Third, the jargon in the field often leads to gross generalizations and 
misunderstandings. See PINKER, BLANK SLATE, supra, at 114. Popular science 
writers often rely heavily on analogy and metaphor to make their points. Id. 
Thus, the field does not lend itself well to sound bites or short descriptions 
which can be taken out of context or too literally. Id.; see also MATT RIDLEY, 
THE GENOME 226 (1999) (explaining how even the common terminology used 
in genetics to describe the inheritability of disease as “a gene for sickle cell 
anemia” or “a gene for diabetes,” is used loosely in media reports, leading to 
even greater confusion for an underinformed public); GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, 
THE PONY FISH’S GLOW AND OTHER CLUES TO PLAN AND PURPOSE IN 
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evolutionary psychology has entered the legal arena, new 
opportunities develop to allow critics to knowingly mislead the 
public at large. Law Professor Steven Goldberg, a critic of 
evolutionary analysis in law, has suggested the need for close 
scrutiny of these proposals based on principles of fairness to 
stepparents9 and constitutional limitations of the use of statistical 
                                                          
NATURE 43 (1997) (providing another example of confusing terminology). The 
reader may well believe that grandparents share “one-quarter of their genes” 
with their grandchildren and one-half of their genes with their parents and 
siblings. This is a common generalization. In fact, humans share 98.6 % of 
their genes with chimpanzees. WILLIAMS, supra, at 43. The 1.4% difference is 
what separates humans from our closest living relatives. Id. More accurately, 
humans share 99.9% of their genes with one another. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 576 (3d ed. 1996). The phrase 
“one-quarter of their genes” is a colloquialism standing for the assertion that a 
grandparent has on average a 25% (of the .1% difference) greater similarity in 
their genetic composition than a person chosen at random from the human 
population. WILLIAMS, supra, at 43. 
9 Steven Goldberg, Statistics Law and Justice, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 255, 
255 (1999). This note takes no exception to Professor Goldberg’s suggestion 
that fairness to disaffected parties should be considered, as should be the case 
with any legislation that is under consideration. 
 For the purposes of this note and for the research and scientific theories 
discussed herein, the term “stepparent” is used broadly to describe a non-
biological mate of a biological parent living in the home with a child. Martin 
Daly & Margo Wilson, An Assessment of Some Proposed Exceptions to the 
Phenomenon of Nepotistic Discrimination Against Stepchildren, 38 ANN. 
ZOOL. FENNICI 287, 290 (2001) [hereinafter Daly & Wilson, Nepotistic 
Discrimination]. This includes formal stepparent relationships and live-in 
boyfriends. Id. The definition excludes all “murders perpetrated by mothers’ 
boyfriends who were not co-residing with their victims.” Id. The definition 
also excludes adoptive parents. See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra 
note 1, at 45. Daly and Wilson explain that the evolutionary influences 
predicting greater incidence of abuse in non-biological families may operate 
differently in adoptive relationships than in other parent-substitute 
relationships. Id. The attendant evolutionary pressures “have been prevalent 
features of the human [ancestral environment] for as long as men and women 
have formed parentally investing couples,” but adoptive relationships are “a 
modern novelty.” Id. at 45-46. The adoptive relationships differ from 
stepparents in that, “adoptive parents are eager to adopt, are screened for 
suitability, and have the option of changing their minds (an option that they 
exercise surprisingly often).” Id. at 45. Although the term “stepparents” is not 
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evidence.10 
In response, this note addresses the constitutional concerns to 
a few of the proposed remedies, examining the differential 
treatment of stepparents and its application to the Equal 
Protection Clause.11 Part I of this note presents the facts 
indicating the greater incidence of child abuse by non-genetic 
parents compared to that of genetic parents and provides the 
evolutionary theories that predict and explain that difference. Part 
II presents three proposals from evolutionary scholars that 
legislators might consider to address the crisis of stepparent child 
abuse and infanticide. Finally, with emphasis on the Supreme 
Court cases discussed in Goldberg’s article, Part III analyzes the 
equal protection issues raised by these proposed changes. This 
note concludes that although the issue of fairness to stepparents 
warrants substantial debate, there are no significant constitutional 
obstacles to any of the proposals put forth by evolutionary 
psychologists and their supporters. 
I. THE CASE AGAINST STEPFAMILIES 
Unquestionably, stepparents have been much maligned 
throughout literary history, the story of Cinderella being the most 
obvious example.12 Folklorists have catalogued stories of 
                                                          
entirely accurate, it is consistent with the literature in this area. When a legal 
distinction is made between non-biological mates living in the home, persons 
standing in loco parentis to the child and legal stepparents, it will be noted in 
the text. 
10 See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 255-56 (arguing that the statistics of 
differential abuse say nothing about any individual’s situation and offering 
several examples of how the Supreme Court has rejected such statistical 
evidence). 
11 Family law issues such as child abuse are dealt with largely on the state 
level. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162 (1899). For the purposes of this 
note, the proposals will be presented in the context of New York law and 
scrutinized under the federal Constitution. When necessary, scientific terms 
will be italicized and defined in the text or in footnotes. 
12 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 1-5. The Grimm 
brothers alone have chronicled several European folk tales of wicked 
stepparents including Cinderella, Hansel and Gretel, Snow White and The 
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“wicked stepparents” across cultures in Europe, Asia and other 
parts of the world.13 Psychological studies reveal that people tend 
to view steprelations pessimistically.14 Social scientists have often 
regarded the results of these studies as stemming from myths and 
stereotypes that create negative relationships between stepparents 
and stepchildren.15 More likely, a stepparent mythology has been 
created by the social scientists themselves.16 The social science 
myth, as it turns out, is that steprelations are not significantly 
different from biological relationships.17 As one researcher has 
noted, “[I]n attempting to counteract stepfamily ‘myths,’ [social 
scientists] have created a counter-factual mythology of their own 
in which social relationships can be reordered by fiat and the 
                                                          
Juniper Tree. Id. at 2. 
13 Id. at 5. Negative characterizations of steprelations can even be found 
in botanical literature. Id. A Japanese spiney broad-leaved plant bears the 
botanical name Mamako-no-shiri-nugui. Id. Translation: The stepchild’s 
bottom-wiper. Id. Daly and Wilson argue that “[t]he cross-cultural ubiquity of 
Cinderella stories is revealing . . . for they would not persist where their 
themes had no resonance.” Id. 
14 David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning from Social Sciences: A 
Model for Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REV. 
49, 63-64 (1992) (“Empirical investigations have consistently found that 
stepparent-stepchild relationships are perceived by many to be inferior to 
parent-child relationships.”). 
15 See Stephen Claxton-Oldfield, Deconstructing the Myth of the Wicked 
Stepparent, 30 MARRIAGE AND FAM. REV. 51, 56 (2000). 
16 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 58. Critics of the 
social sciences have argued that leading sociologists, anthropologists and 
political scientists satisfy themselves with “folk psychology” in favor of 
empirically tested evidence from biology and scientific psychology. See 
WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 6, at 183. Ironically, in the case of 
steprelations, sociologists argue against “folk psychology” when those alleged 
“myths” concur with the results of empirical evidence.  
17 See Fine & Fine, supra note 14, at 63-64. After noting the negative 
perception of stepparent relationships, the authors maintain that “actual 
differences in quality have been found to be small and some stepparents and 
stepchildren have reported that, over time, they have been able to establish 
relationships that were mutually supportive and endearing.” Id. (emphasis 
added). It would be interesting to know whether more than “some” genetic 
parents would qualify their feelings for their children so explicitly. 
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statistical facts about differential violence can be dismissed.”18 As 
study after study continues to provide more evidence on the 
subject, the facts become increasingly difficult to ignore.19 
A. The Facts 
Child maltreatment in the United States is a national 
emergency.20 In 2000 alone, 879,000 children were abused or 
neglected.21 Although child fatalities are relatively rare in 
comparison to abuse cases, they have increased over the last ten 
years.22 The federal government reported 1,200 substantiated 
cases of fatal child abuse or neglect in 2000.23 Some government 
officials believe this number to be too low, suggesting at least 
2,000 and as many as 5,000 child fatalities per year.24 The fact 
that children living with stepparents are disproportionately the 
victims of severe and fatal abuse is not included in the report.25 
Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that residing with a 
non-biological parent greatly increases a child’s risk of being 
                                                          
18 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 58. 
19 Id.; see infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text (documenting the 
increased risk of abuse to stepchildren). 
20 PANEL ON RESEARCH ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL , UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 42 
(1993). 
21 NAT’L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 11 YEARS OF REPORTING CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 2000 11 (2002) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000], 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm00/cm2000. 
pdf. 
22 NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO., CHILD 
FATALITIES FACT SHEET, at http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/factsheets/ 
fatality.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
23 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 53. “‘Substantiated’ is 
a conclusion that the allegation of maltreatment or risk of maltreatment was 
supported by state law or state policy.” Id. at 9. 
24 See FACT SHEET, supra note 22. 
25 CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21; see also DALY & 
WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 39 (describing the general lack of 
recognition of children living in stepparent homes as being at high risk for 
abuse). 
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abused.26 
In the United States, a study by the American Humane 
Association of 87,789 children identified as maltreated revealed 
that twenty-five percent of severe abuse cases resided with one 
genetic parent and one non-biological parent, and forty-three 
percent of children killed by abuse lived with substitute parents.27 
These statistics are even more disturbing when we consider that 
the mean age of the victims was 3.6 years old and only a small 
percentage of children at such a young age live in stepparent 
families.28 Based on conservative population estimates, the 
increased risk of infanticide for children under four in stepparent 
families was one hundred times greater than children living with 
two genetic parents.29 These studies are consistent with those 
conducted in other western countries.30 
                                                          
26 See infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text (documenting the 
increased risk of abuse to stepchildren). 
27 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 88 (1988) [hereinafter 
DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE]. The researchers used data from infanticide and 
substantiated allegations of severe abuse. Id. They recognize the potential for 
detection bias in child abuse. Id. That is to say, if stepparents are already 
more suspect, they may also be more likely to get caught or be falsely accused 
of abuse. Id. They contend any possible allegations of abuse against 
stepparents based on “myths and stereotypes” of the reporters (consistent with 
social scientists’ claims) will be minimized by the substantiated homicide of an 
infant. DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 31. 
28 See Daly & Wilson, Nepotistic Discrimination, supra note 9, at 289. 
The proportion of children who reside with a stepparent at birth is near zero 
and increases steadily with age. Id. 
29 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 88. “Census bureaus of 
the United States and Canada d[id] not distinguish natural parents from 
substitutes.” Id. The researchers reported that they relied on conservative 
estimates based on other surveys and that the true proportion of stepchild 
murder is likely to be even higher. Id. at 88-89. The 1990 U.S. Census 
provides some information on stepparent families. See BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1995 64 tbl.77 (1996). According to the Census Bureau, “[c]ategories 
showing natural born, step and adoptive children are necessary to reflect 
increasingly complex family structures created as a result of remarriage, 
disruption or cohabitation.” Id. 
30 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 32-36. In addition, 
recent research indicates that this is a global phenomenon, indicating that it is 
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A 1984 study of Canadian families found that the increased 
risk of child abuse was forty times greater for preschoolers when 
the child lived with one biological parent and one non-biological 
parent (the increased risk was only ten times greater for teenage 
victims).31 The risk of fatal child abuse was seventy times 
greater.32 Another Canadian study, based on the Canadian 
National Homicide Archive with data as recent as 1994, found 
that stepfathers were sixty times more likely to kill their children 
than were biological parents.33 
A 1973 study in England reveals that British men acting in 
loco parentis were 150 times more likely to commit infanticide 
and were responsible for fifty-two percent of the infant deaths 
studied.34 The average age of the victim was only fifteen 
months.35 Although the statistics vary considerably, a clear trend 
emerges. Children living with one biological parent and a non-
genetic parent are at a substantially higher risk of abuse and 
                                                          
less likely to be culturally dependent. Id. “Researchers have reported that 
children incurred excess risk of various sorts of mistreatment and/or mortality 
at the hands of stepparents among Ache hunter-gatherers [of Paraguay], and in 
Australia, Columbia, Finland, Korea, Malaysia and Trinidad.” Id. Hunter-
gatherer societies like the Ache “provide the best model to which the human 
animal evolved and to which our psyches are adapted.” Id. at 36. Life is 
challenging for the Ache, especially if you are a stepchild. Id. Nineteen 
percent of Ache children raised by two genetic parents die by age fifteen. Id. 
For Ache children raised by a mother and a stepfather, forty-three percent die 
before their fifteenth birthday. Id. 
31 Id. at 30. 
32 Id. at 32. Though this result is significantly lower than the American 
study, this sample also included single mothers, another high risk group, 
which was not included in the American study. Id. 
33 Id. at 210; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Some Differential Attributes 
of Lethal Assaults on Small Children by Stepfathers Versus Genetic Fathers, 
15 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 207, 209 (1994). “Stepfathers” in this 
study are defined as non-biological parents married to the child’s biological 
mother and common law fathers. Id. Common law fathers are defined as “a 
substitute father in loco parentis by virtue of his de facto or common law 
relationship with the victim’s mother.” Id. 
34 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 90. 
35 Id. 
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infanticide than children living with two genetic parents.36 
Not only does stepparent abuse differ from parental abuse in 
frequency, studies indicate that there are significant differences in 
the circumstances under which the abuse occurs.37 Fatal abuse at 
the hands of stepparents is most likely to occur when the child is 
very young,38 is less likely to be the result of a psychiatric 
condition in the abuser,39 and is likely to result from different 
forms of assault.40 These data suggest that, aside from the greater 
likelihood of violence against their stepchildren, non-biological 
parents may have different motivations or factors influencing 
their acts of violence.41 
If stepchild abuse is both quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from child abuse committed by biological parents, what 
could possibly account for these differences? Society’s aversion 
to child abuse and infanticide and the enormous disparity in abuse 
rates suggest a particularly compelling need for a fearless search 
for answers to this problem. Unfortunately, traditional cultural-
based theories of the social sciences have been unable to 
adequately explain the wide discrepancy in the incidence of abuse 
between these groups.42 
                                                          
36 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 26-36. 
37 Id. at 34-35. 
38 Id. at 91. The increased risk for fatal abuse by a non-biological parent 
is greatest when the child is under two years old and diminishes over time. Id. 
39 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 34-35. 
40 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 90. While biological 
parents and stepparents in the Canadian Study were equally likely to kill their 
children using a firearm, stepparents in Canada were 120 times more likely to 
beat their children to death. Id. In England and Canada, eighty percent of 
homicidal stepparents were found to have battered, kicked or bludgeoned their 
victims to death, while the majority of homicidal genetic parents used less 
assaultive means. Id. at 34. In addition, while nineteen percent of men who 
killed their own children also killed themselves in the same violent act, only 
1.5% of murdering stepparents took their own life. DALY & WILSON, 
CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 34 (noting the twelve-fold difference). 
41 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 35. 
42 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1167-70 (noting that the 
prevailing social science theories of child abuse all focus on the present, fail to 
account for the biological relationship and have been unsuccessful in 
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Figure 1: The Risk of Being Killed by a Stepparent Versus a Natural Parent in Relation 
to the Child’s Age. Canada 1974-1983. Source: Reprinted with permission from Martin  
Daly and Margo Wilson. Homicide. (New York: Aldine de Gruyter).  
Copyright © 1988 by Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
B. The Theories 
By recognizing the importance of biology in human behavior, 
evolutionary psychologists predicted greater incidence of abuse 
among non-biological parents before the statistical data was even 
available.43 The following section provides a brief evolutionary 
primer and explains the specific theories posited to account for 
stepparent abuse.44  
                                                          
attempting to stem the rising tide of the child abuse problem in the last twenty 
years). In fact, prior to the researchers’ evolutionary approach to child abuse, 
no studies existed comparing the incidence of abuse between genetic and non-
genetic parents. DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 20. It took 
an evolutionary perspective of the problem to even think to ask the right 
question. Id. 
43 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 20. 
44 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1129-57 (providing a more 
thorough evolutionary primer and explaining the concepts discussed in this 
section). 
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“Evolutionary theory” is a general metatheory that explains 
the fact of biological evolution as stemming from natural 
selection and sexual selection.45 Under the larger umbrella theory 
of evolution by natural selection, other midlevel theories such as 
kin selection explain a wide variety of phenomenon in various 
domains of functioning.46 There are two more specific 
evolutionary theories that predict greater incidence of infanticide 
and abuse of stepchildren at the hands of their stepparents: 
Discriminative Parental Solicitude Theory (DPST) and 
Reproductive Access Theory (RAT).47 DPST is based on 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection and kin selection,48 while 
RAT is based on the notion of sexual selection.49 
1. Natural Selection, Kin Selection and Discriminative 
Parental Solicitude 
A brief explanation of natural selection and kin selection is 
necessary for a proper understanding of the mechanics of DPST. 
a. Natural Selection 
Natural selection is the primary force that drives biological 
evolution.50 It is “the process through which certain types of 
organisms are more reproductively successful than other types, 
thereby disproportionately passing along those traits that led to 
their success.”51 Natural selection requires the interaction of three 
factors: variation, heredity and differential reproduction.52 
Individuals differ in their behavioral and physical traits.53 Traits 
                                                          
45 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1171. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1175. 
48 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 11-14. 
49 SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, THE LANGURS OF ABU: FEMALE AND MALE 
STRATEGIES OF REPRODUCTION 246 (1977). 
50 See DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 43. 
51 MORTON JENKINS, 101 KEY IDEAS IN EVOLUTION 71 (2000). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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are inherited from ancestors and modified by genetic mutation 
and sexual recombination.54 Due to these differences, some 
individuals may have a reproductive advantage over others and 
produce more viable offspring.55 As a result of greater 
reproductive success, individuals surviving into future 
generations will tend to be better equipped than their ancestors to 
deal with the challenges of the environment of their ancestors.56 
Over successive generations the advantages inevitably produced 
through natural selection are called “evolutionary adaptations.”57 
b. Kin Selection 
“If evolution consists of a competition among individuals for 
survival and reproduction, it makes little sense to help others.”58 
While cooperative behavior is common when both parties stand 
to gain from the interaction,59 altruistic behavior is relatively rare 
in the biological world.60 The fact that altruistic behavior exists at 
all in the natural world presented a paradox for evolutionary 
                                                          
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. For most organisms throughout history, the ancestral environment 
was substantially similar to the present environment, so any advantage gained 
based on the ancestral environment would also be advantageous in the 
organism’s present environment. DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 
1, at 40-43. As a result of human cultural evolution, however, adaptations in 
our ancestral environment can sometimes be maladaptive in the present 
environment. Id. (discussing the legal considerations stemming from these 
“maladaptive adaptations”) See Owen Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41 
JURIMETRICS J. 289 (2001). [hereinafter Jones, Irrationality]; Owen Jones, 
Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral 
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001). 
57 DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 43. 
58 See CARL ZIMMER, EVOLUTION: THE TRIUMPH OF AN IDEA 249 (2001). 
59 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1149. See also ROBERT 
WRIGHT, NONZERO 253 (2000) (noting the importance of cooperative 
interaction between organisms since the earliest life forms appeared on earth). 
60 See DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 478. In 
all mammalian species studied so far, the rate of intra-species killing is several 
thousand times greater than the highest homicide rate in any American city. 
Id. 
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theorists.61 Kin selection provided the solution, harmonizing 
altruistic behavior with natural selection when that behavior 
benefits genetically related individuals.62 While altruistic behavior 
may not benefit the altruistic individual, it is a good way to make 
more copies of an altruistic individual’s genes.63 Kin selection is 
“the evolutionary process that maximizes one’s ability to treat 
others [preferentially] according to their genetic similarity to 
oneself.”64 Altruistic behavior among kin is the result of an 
unconscious cost-benefit analysis considering both the risk to the 
actor and the mathematical degree of relatedness to the party to 
whom the benefit is being offered.65 An organism whose genes 
predispose it to act in the interest of those most genetically 
similar will benefit when the cost of that act is outweighed by its 
                                                          
61 ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 249. 
62 See DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 478. 
Social species that help one another most often share a high degree of genetic 
relatedness. Id. Examples of kin selection at work include the fact that 
individuals in closely related groups of animals within a species are much 
more likely than groups that are not closely related to provide alarm calls to 
their group drawing attention to themselves from predators. Id. Without 
producing any offspring, an organism can increase its genetic success, merely 
by supporting and protecting its close relatives. Id. at 479. Female drone bees 
who share three-fourths (as opposed to one-half in most other animals) of their 
genes with siblings, forego reproduction altogether, in support of their 
unusually closely related queen. See ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 248-49. 
 Reciprocal altruism explains the much less common occurrence of 
altruistic behavior toward non-related individuals. See DENNETT, DARWIN’S 
DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 479. The most frequently cited example 
occurs in vampire bats who will occasionally share their bloody bounty with 
their unsuccessful cavemates after a night of hunting. Id. Reciprocal altruism, 
however, also requires self-interest in that the benefit conferred is based on the 
expectation of a future benefit from the recipient. Id. Reciprocal altruism 
requires advanced cognitive abilities to keep score of who owes a favor to 
whom. Id. This explains its rarity in the animal kingdom and its more 
common occurrence among humans. Id. Dennett describes reciprocal altruism 
as “the first steps toward human promise keeping.” Id. 
63 ZIMMER supra note 58, at 249. 
64 WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 42-43. 
65 See DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA, supra note 8, at 478. 
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genetic relatedness to the relative being helped.66 
c. Discriminative Parental Solicitude Theory 
DPST is based on the concept of kin selection and relates 
more directly to the issue of infanticide.67 Other than identical 
twins, no one is more closely related to an individual than his 
own genetic children.68 According to the theory, “[p]arental care 
makes a clear direct contribution to parental fitness.”69 Parents 
will invest in offspring most capable of turning that investment 
into reproductive success for the parent.70 Investing in unrelated 
children, without a reciprocal payoff for the caregiver, decreases 
fitness when the cost is considered in terms of foregone 
opportunities to reproduce.71 Application of the theory rephrases 
the question of increased danger to stepchildren. Instead of 
asking “why do stepparents abuse their stepchildren?” theorists 
inquire, “why are parents less inclined to abuse their children 
                                                          
66 WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 44. For this reason, many scientists prefer 
the term “inclusive fitness,” as opposed to reproductive success, because the 
former includes the concept of kin selection. See ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 
249. 
67 Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1177. 
68 DAVID BURNE, GET A GRIP ON EVOLUTION 137 (1999). Individuals 
share fifty percent of their genes with their parents, their full siblings and their 
own genetic children. Id. See supra note 8 (acknowledging the technical 
inaccuracy of this stastistic). 
69 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 42. 
70 Id. The theory is broader than just step-relations. Id. at 44. DPST 
considers three classes of factors that may contribute to reduced parental 
investment in a child. Id. The first class includes the likelihood that the parent 
lacks a genetic relationship to the child (including not only step-relations, but 
also uncertain paternity). Id. “The second class encompasses indications that 
the offspring itself may be of dubious quality, and hence a poor prospect to 
contribute to parental fitness, even if nurtured properly.” Id. The third class 
includes indications that circumstances are not favorable for child rearing and 
takes into account such factors as scarce resources, lack of social support, 
alternative avenues of parental investment, such as older siblings, and whether 
there are likely to be future opportunities to reproduce. Id. 
71 Id. 
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than unrelated stepparents?”72 The theory predicts that “where 
parental feeling is weak, the risk of parental mistreatment is 
exacerbated.”73 Proponents of the theory argue that the 
interaction of biological and environmental factors will make a 
child more or less likely to suffer abuse.74 
Ultimately, the primary factor creating strong parental 
feelings is the genetic relationship.75 Considering the general 
evolutionary principles discussed thus far, several reasons for 
preferential treatment to biological children emerge.76 Genetic 
success is only enhanced when it benefits children who survive to 
reproductive age.77 Organisms can adopt different reproductive 
strategies, such as providing few resources to many offspring 
with hopes that at least a few survive or, as humans tend to do, 
investing an enormous amount of resources in only a few 
children, thereby greatly increasing each child’s chances of 
survival.78 The killing of one’s own offspring will often defeat 
those reproductive strategies.79 Considered from the perspective 
of kin selection, generously providing for one’s own offspring, 
who share fifty percent of each parent’s genes, will often be in 
                                                          
72 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1177. “[N]ot caring for 
infants is the default evolved predisposition . . . .” Id.; see also Daly & 
Wilson, Nepotistic Discrimination, supra note 9, at 294. The authors 
emphasize that infanticide committed by stepparents is not itself an adaptive 
behavior but merely “[a] predictable by-product of the fact that costly parental 
care can be parasitized and that parental solicitude has therefore evolved to be 
individualized and preferentially directed to one’s own children.” Id. 
73 See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Discriminative Parental Solicitude 
Theory: A Biological Perspective, 42 J. OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 277, 
281 (1980). 
74 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 44. 
75 DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 37. 
76 DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 44. 
77 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1195 (noting the common 
practice of infanticide of the disabled in other cultures). 
78 See JARED DIAMOND, WHY IS SEX FUN: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN 
SEXUALITY 16-17 (1997). 
79 Id. There may be some instances when the killing of one’s own 
offspring will be beneficial to the reproductive success of the organism. See 
supra note 71. 
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the best interest of that parent when a cost benefit-analysis is 
applied; whereas providing for a biological stranger generally 
will not be in one’s genetic interest.80 
In many ways, predictions of DPST are consistent with 
empirical social science findings.81 Even with a biological 
relationship, parents discriminate among their own children based 
on a number of factors.82 In some instances, a biological parent 
may “choose”83 to sacrifice a present child’s best interest in favor 
of retaining her ability to have more children in the future.84 A 
younger parent, with more reproductive years remaining, would 
receive a greater benefit from this choice.85 Conversely, an older 
parent may find that her opportunities to bear more children are 
foreclosed by age, therefore making it more beneficial to invest 
in presently living offspring.86 DPST predicts higher incidence of 
infanticide and abuse in general among young mothers compared 
to older mothers.87 It is well established that children born to 
young mothers are at greater risk of maltreatment.88 A parent 
                                                          
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See DIAMOND, supra note 78, at 24. 
83 The term “choose” does not mean to imply a conscious choice on the 
part of a parent, but rather unconscious considerations in a cost-benefit 
analysis. Id. at 16-17. “Many of the so-called choices are actually 
programmed into an animal’s anatomy and physiology.” Id. at 17. 
84 See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 52. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 52 tbl.4-3. In 
2000, female parents were perpetrators of child maltreatment in 65.1% of 
cases compared with 37.3% for male parents. Id. Of female perpetrators, 
41.9% were less than thirty years of age. Id. at 47. 
 Though the fact that children born to young mothers are at higher risk of 
abuse is consistent with social science findings, the theories social scientists 
use to explain this phenomenon do not include evolutionary considerations. 
See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1168. “The conspicuous absence 
from the prevailing theories of any mention of human evolution, or evolved 
behavioral predispositions of any kind, reflects a passive and unexamined 
assumption that, absent genetic defects, human behavior is not significantly 
influenced by the cumulated effects of natural selection on our species.” Id. 
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may consider the likelihood of the child surviving to reproductive 
age.89 A parent may also consider alternative recipients of the 
parent’s investment of resources and preserve parental resources 
to present children most likely to benefit from them.90 These 
other factors are more likely to play the strongest roles when 
resources are scarce and there is not enough to go around among 
biological children.91 Prevailing theories and social science 
findings recognize that children born into poverty are at a greater 
risk of physical abuse and infanticide.92 DPST is consistent with 
present empirical findings and explains more phenomenon than 
prevailing theories.93 
2. Sexual Selection and Reproductive Access Theory 
The second theory predicting greater incidence of infanticide 
among stepparents is Reproductive Access Theory, which is 
based on the Darwinian concept of sexual selection.94  
                                                          
89 See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 52. As a child gets 
older, her chances of living to reproductive age increase, and the prospective 
burden she places on her parents decreases. Id. 
90 DIAMOND, supra note 78, at 23. 
91 See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 43-53. 
92 See FACT SHEET, supra note 22. See also Jones, Child Abuse, supra 
note 2, at 1164. The Social-Cultural Model emphasizes the contributions of 
social pressure including economic hardship. Id. 
93 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1223. To the extent that the 
evolutionary theory has more predictive power than social science theories, it 
should receive greater consideration. Id. It should be reiterated that 
evolutionary analysis recognizes the importance of cultural explanations, and 
an integrated world view that includes both biological and cultural influences 
can, when the two are not directly conflicting, provide the most accurate 
understanding of many behavioral phenomena. Id. “The point of integration is 
to construct a unified, coherent, interwoven, historically accurate, and 
generally superior theory of behavior that impedes or furthers social access to 
the specified goal.” Id. at 1223-24. 
94 See generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 136 
(Gramercy Books 1979) (1859). 
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a. Sexual Selection 
Unlike natural selection, sexual selection “depends not on a 
struggle for existence, but on a struggle between the males for 
possession of the females; the result is not death to the 
unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring.”95 In most 
species who invest a significant amount of resources in raising 
their young, females have a disproportionately large investment 
in creating children.96 Among internally fertilizing species, the 
males of that species can adopt a reproductive strategy of low 
parental investment and attempt to sire a large number of 
offspring, whereas childbearing puts practical limitations on the 
same strategy for women.97 Males compete both directly and 
                                                          
95 Id. The classic example is that of the peacock and the peahen. Id. at 
137. See also ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 236-38. The male peacock is known 
for its elaborate tail display with more than 150 brightly colored “eyes,” while 
the female peahen looks drab in comparison. Id. The peacocks compete for the 
attention of the peahens by displaying their tail, the theory being that the 
bright plumage and decorative pattern provide key markers of genetic health. 
Id. The peahens are very selective and will reject a peacock with less than 130 
“eyes” on his tail. Id. at 238. The peahens, through their preference for larger 
tails with lots of eyes, provide the selection pressure necessary for males to 
develop more and more ornate displays. Id. This occurs in spite of the fact 
that the peacock may be more conspicuous to predators and less able to fend 
off attacks due to his cumbersome tail feathers. Id. at 235. The individual 
peacock’s survival does him little good in the “survival of the fittest” unless he 
can successfully reproduce. Id. 
 The sex-specific definition is outdated, as instances of sexual selection 
have since been noted in both males and females. See ZIMMER, supra note 58, 
at 238. For example, among pipefish, it is the females who are brightly 
colored and compete for the attention of males. Id. In this species, it is the 
male pipefish who carry the eggs in a pouch and provide the majority of the 
parental investment, while the females can have several males carry their eggs 
simultaneously. Id. Jared Diamond provides a more complete description of 
this phenomenon, known as “sex-role reversal polyandry,” and the limited 
circumstances in which it is likely to occur. See DIAMOND, supra note 78, at 
26-29. 
96 Id. at 238. 
97 Id. at 234. The most fecund woman in recorded history bore a “mere” 
sixty-nine children, while Moroccan Emperor Ismael the Bloodthirsty was the 
most fruitful male, siring approximately fourteen hundred children. DIAMOND, 
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indirectly for reproductive access to females, who are in a 
position to be more selective because they sacrifice more in 
bearing children.98 The most frequently cited examples of sexual 
selection at work include characteristics related to direct male-
male combat, such as large antlers or sexual dimorphism and 
characteristics related to male sexual display, such as a peacock’s 
tail.99 RAT is an even less direct form of male to male 
competition and brings sexual selection to a grisly extreme.100 
b. Reproductive Access Theory 
RAT is based on the concept of sexual selection.101 The 
theory predicts that, under some circumstances, males will be 
more likely to kill young unweaned infants in order to make a 
female more reproductively available to sire his children.102 
Species most likely to be influenced by selection pressure leading 
to infanticide of unrelated infants include those in which females 
experience reduced fertility while weaning an infant.103 This 
phenomenon is known as “lactational amenorrhea” and is well 
documented in a variety of mammals, including humans.104 When 
a mother stops nursing, her fertility immediately increases, 
making her available to bear the children of another male.105 As a 
result, a male who murders the unweaned infants of his new mate 
                                                          
supra note 78, at 36-37. 
98 See ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 235-39. 
99 See DARWIN, supra note 94, at 136-37. 
100 See ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 248. While male to male competition 
for mates can be a rather bloody business, as evidenced by an elephant seal’s 
fight to the death to “protect” his harem, both combatants are willing 
participants. MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
HUMAN NATURE 133 (1993). Infanticide, however, results in the slaughter of 
helpless innocents. 
101 See HRDY, supra note 49, at 246. 
102 Id. at 277. 
103 Id. 
104 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 9; see also M.S. 
Kramer & R. Kauma, Optimal Duration of Exclusive Breastfeeding, 
MEDSCAPE (2002), at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/435888. 
105 See Kramer & Kauma, supra note 104. 
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will have a reproductive advantage over those who do not by 
accelerating his mate’s ability to bear his children (provided there 
are no other repercussions to the act).106 This phenomenon is seen 
widely in the animal kingdom, including in some of human’s 
closest living primate relatives, most notably chimpanzees and 
gorillas.107 While DPST applies to both men and women, if RAT 
is applicable to humans, then children living with stepfathers are 
at an even greater risk than those living with stepmothers.108 It 
should be noted that application of RAT to humans is far more 
controversial than DPST, even among evolutionary psychology 
scholars.109 The theory is mentioned here, however, to point out 
                                                          
106 See HRDY, supra note 49, at 277. 
107 Id. at 244-47; see also Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1190. 
108 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1159. Although DPST applies 
to men and women, it may not apply equally. DIAMOND, supra note 78, at 37. 
“[A]nimals have programmed instincts that lead them to provide (or not to 
provide) parental care, and this instinctive ‘choice’ of behavior can differ 
between sexes of the same species.” Id. Men may still be more predisposed to 
abuse or infanticide because the cost-benefit analysis will be different for men 
and women. See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1159. 
 For the implications of RAT, see HRDY, supra note 49, at 277. The rarity 
of very young children living with a stepmother has limited research in this 
regard. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 85. The pool of 
data for the kind of large-scale longitudinal study necessary to examine the 
problem has been unavailable. Id. 
 Although the sexual selection hypothesis appears to apply exclusively to 
males among mammals, this is not an exclusively male phenomenon in the 
entire animal kingdom. See ZIMMER, supra note 58, at 247. The jacana is a 
Panamanian bird that provides the exception that proves the rule. Id. Unlike 
most animals, the male jacana sits on the eggs and raises the young while the 
females defend the territory. Id. When a female defeats a rival and takes over 
the nest and her opponent’s mate, the first order of business is to destroy all of 
the eggs before mating with the male. Id. at 247-48. Birds can share the 
responsibility of caring for their developing embryos, whereas that opportunity 
is not available for mammals due to internal fertilization. DIAMOND, supra 
note 78, at 25-29. 
109 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 37. Daly & 
Wilson assert that sexually selected infanticide is not a human adaptation. Id. 
First, infanticide is rare in the human population relative to those animals 
where sexually selected infanticide is common. Id. Second, “[s]tepfathers are 
much more likely to inflict non-lethal abuse than to kill, and such abuse is 
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that evolutionary psychology does present the potential for sex-
based classifications which becomes relevant in Part III of this 
note. 
II. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
While an evolutionary perspective has been useful in directing 
research in the area of child abuse and has led to extraordinary 
discoveries such as those discussed in Part I, the potential legal 
remedies to the child abuse crisis offered by Professor Jones and 
likeminded contemporaries have been relatively modest. This 
section discusses three of those proposals.110 
First, improved data collection methods might be 
implemented in order to get a better understanding of the exact 
scope of the problem. Second, consideration of the presence of a 
stepparent in the risk assessment phase of child abuse 
investigations may help child welfare investigators focus their 
attention on cases that are most likely to result in substantiated 
instances of abuse. Third, in the event of the unexplained death 
of an infant in a stepparent family, requiring child fatality review 
                                                          
obviously not a ‘well designed’ means to hasten the production of one’s own 
children, nor even reduce the costs of stepparental investment.” Id. Third, 
“humans live [and evolved] in a complex social environment, which involves 
maintaining one’s reputation and the possibility of retribution.” Id. at 38. 
Considering these factors, “the average benefits conferred for killing 
stepchildren would [n]ever have outweighed the average costs enough” to 
provide the selection pressure necessary for “specifically infanticidal 
inclinations.” Id. Jones points out that the [reproductive access] theory would 
be expected to have greater vitality in a species in which the average tenure of 
a male to a female is short, as it is in lions and langurs, than when the average 
tenure is longer, as it is in humans. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1213-
14. “Moreover, the widely documented and substantial differences among the 
social organization of primate species suggests further caution and 
recommends that the more general DPST may better explain observable, 
human stepfather infanticide.” Id. at 1214. 
 110 These proposals are put forward for consideration, not to advocate for 
their appropriateness, but for their potential effectiveness in combating the 
problem of child abuse. Other than discussing potential constitutional barriers, 
weighing the benefits of these proposals against their harm to stepparents is 
beyond the scope of this note. 
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team investigations may cause more cases of infanticide to be 
discovered. 
A. Improved Data Collection 
The most modest proposal to be examined is the suggestion 
that increased study and improved data collection can increase 
our understanding of the scope of the problem.111 Currently, most 
state and federal agencies do not distinguish between 
stepfamilies, adoptive families and families with two genetic 
parents.112 Researchers and legal scholars, including Jones, have 
proposed mandating state agencies to collect data in ways that 
differentiate between genetic and non-genetic parents.113 
Although child abuse investigations are conducted exclusively 
on the state level, Congress has recognized that child abuse is a 
national problem and has addressed the issue by establishing the 
National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Information.114 The National Clearinghouse collects child abuse 
data from the states for purposes of a national study of the issue, 
makes recommendations to the states on productive areas for 
legislation and acts as a distribution center for information on 
child abuse for state and local governments as well as 
researchers.115 At present the National Clearinghouse does not 
                                                          
111 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 52-53. 
112 Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1229. Even though evolutionary 
psychologists have proposed this remedy for more than a decade, “most 
studies and reporting procedures that today capture information regarding a 
perpetrator’s relationship to an abused child continue to collapse ‘stepparents’ 
into the definition of ‘parents.’” Id. at 1230. 
113 Id. at 1235. 
114 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (2002). 
The Secretary shall, in consultation with other Federal agencies and 
recognized experts in the field, carry out a continuing 
interdisciplinary program of research that is designed to provide 
information needed to better protect children from abuse or neglect 
and to improve the well-being of abused or neglected children, with 
at least a portion of such research being field initiated. 
Id. 
115 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 1-3. 
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report or maintain statistics distinguishing stepparents from 
biological parents.116 Improved data collection can lead to a more 
precise understanding of the problem and might be welcomed 
even by critics eager to disprove what they believe to be a 
myth.117 In the absence of administrative initiative in this area, 
the following provision (hereinafter Proposed Data Collection 
Statute), which would amend the statutory scheme creating the 
National Clearinghouse, could at least partially remedy the 
problem:118  
The National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse and Neglect 
Information shall include in its data the living 
arrangement of the victim and the biological relationship 
of the victim to the perpetrator.119 
                                                          
116 See id. at 52 tbl.4-3. Currently the National Clearinghouse provides 
data on family relationships with the following categories in gathering data on 
abuse: parents (distinguished by sex), other relatives, foster parents, 
residential facility staff, child day care, non-caretakers and unknown. Id. The 
categories do not distinguish stepparents or adoptive parents from genetic 
parents. Id. at 47. Furthermore, according to the previous edition of the same 
report, “[s]tates define child maltreatment as the abuse or neglect of their 
parents or by ‘other caretakers’ responsible for their children’s care.” ADMIN. 
FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999 33 (2000) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 
1999], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm99/ 
cm99.pdf. But, “[s]tates differ in definitions of who count as caretakers.” Id. 
117 See Claxton-Oldfield, supra note 15, at 54; see also DALY & WILSON, 
CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 52-53 (alleging that the absence of accurate 
federal data on stepparent abuse and the prevalence of stepparents—as defined 
broadly in this note to include live-in boyfriends and legal stepparents—
required them to use conservative estimates based on less reliable sources 
thereby providing ideological critics with an excuse to ignore their work). 
 118 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2003).  
119 Jones has offered a similar suggestion. See Jones, Child Abuse, supra 
note 2, at 1235.  
 Currently, the U.S. Census uses the following categories to define a 
child’s family relationship: adopted children; children in traditional nuclear 
families; cohabitating parent-child families; “blended,” or stepparent, 
families; and children in extended family households. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN (2001). 
This might make a good starting point, with further classification provided for 
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B. Risk Assessment 
Researchers and legal scholars have suggested considering 
familial status as a factor in the risk assessment phase of child 
abuse investigations.120 Many child abuse investigators are 
overworked and lack sufficient resources to thoroughly 
investigate every claim.121 Efforts to increase the likelihood of 
finding substantiated cases of abuse, when they are present, 
would allow these beleaguered investigators protect children 
more efficiently.122 
New York is a prime candidate for this proposal. New York 
City, for example, has seen a dramatic decline in substantiated 
cases of abuse, from forty-one percent in 1990 to twenty percent 
in 1996.123 “Absent other evidence, the . . . decline in . . . 
[substantiated] cases would be good news. However, these trends 
were accompanied by a sharp cut in [Child Protective Service] 
staff, and this cut likely had an effect on the quality of the 
investigations.”124 During the same period, the average child 
protective worker caseload soared from twelve to twenty-four.125 
                                                          
cohabitating parents that are biologically related to the child and those that are 
not. 
120  Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1237 (noting the need for child 
protective agencies to weigh the risk of stigmatizing stepfamilies against the 
potential benefits of stepchild abuse prevention programs); Colin Tudge, 
Relative Danger, NAT. HIST., Sept. 1997, at 28-31 (interviewing Martin Daly, 
who calls for child protective agencies to recognize children in stepparent 
families as being at high risk for child abuse); see also PINKER, BLANK SLATE, 
supra note 8, at 165. 
121 Jones, Child Abuse, supra, note 2, at 1237 (noting this common 
criticism of the child protection system). 
122 Id. at 1238. “Evolutionary analysis suggests that, if the agency were to 
ascribe more weight to the presence of a stepparent, say by modifying its 
standard operating procedures to preferentially investigate reports of child 
abuse in homes with substitute parents, children would be better protected.” 
Id. 
123 CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, THE STATE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES IN 
THE 1990’S: SOCIAL SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY 24 (1997), at http://www. 
cbcny.org/socserv2.html. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 25. 
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Staff reductions and budget cuts have created incentives for 
workers to err on the side of failing to report a finding of abuse 
in borderline cases rather than refer the case for preventive 
services or foster care.126 In New York, 67.4 percent of 
investigated cases led to a finding that the allegation of 
maltreatment was unsubstantiated in the year 2000, while the 
national average for same period was 58.4 percent.127 The 
proposed New York statute, to be titled “Consanguinity as a 
Factor in Child Abuse Investigations” (hereinafter Proposed Risk 
Assessment Statute) reads as follows:  
The Legislature recognizes that a child living in the home 
with a non-biological parent is at a high risk of child 
abuse. When conducting a risk assessment of potential 
victims of child abuse, investigators shall consider this 
risk in prioritizing cases for review. These cases should 
be given priority in the speed with which they are 
addressed.128 
C. Child Fatality Review Teams 
This section proposes requiring child fatality review teams to 
investigate the presence of infanticide when the death of an infant 
occurs in a stepparent family. More diligent investigations into 
mysterious child deaths in stepparent families can result in the 
detection of more substantiated cases of infanticide, which in turn 
provides greater protection for other children who may be living 
in the home of an abuser. 
                                                          
126 Id. The Child Welfare League of America (CWLA) reports that the 
benchmark for CPS worker caseloads is twelve. Id. According to the Citizens 
Budget Commission report, New York CPS workers are maintaining double 
their recommended capacity of cases. Id. 
127 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 17 tbl.2-5. 
128 At present, “decisions made by child protection agencies are not 
affected by the fact a child resides in a stepfamily.” Jones, Child Abuse, supra 
note 2, at 1237 n.363. Jones has suggested that such a proposal, informed by 
the underlying evolutionary principles discussed herein, may provide greater 
protection to children, admittedly at the potential to cost of stigmatizing 
stepparents. Id. at 1237-38. 
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Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) “is the sudden death 
of an infant under one year of age that remains unexplained after 
thorough case investigation, including performance of a complete 
autopsy, examination of the death scene and a review of the 
clinical history.”129 Because instances of fatal abuse are often 
difficult to detect when the manner of death is shaken baby 
syndrome or soft suffocation,130 which can often be detected only 
through an autopsy, the National Clearinghouse recommends that 
all states implement mandatory autopsy statutes and child fatality 
death review teams to distinguish true SIDS cases from fatal 
abuse.131 The National Clearinghouse estimates that five percent 
of reported cases of SIDS are in fact undetected instances of fatal 
child abuse, and that the best means of distinguishing infanticide 
from SIDS cases is through mandatory autopsy and child fatality 
review teams.132 “By the end of 1999, seventeen states had 
                                                          
129 Comm. on Child Abuse and Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Distinguishing Sudden Infant Death Syndrome From Child Abuse Fatalities, in 
107(2) PEDIATRICS 437 (2001) [hereinafter Distinguishing SIDS]. Further 
confounding the detection of abuse cases, is the fact that SIDS is correlated 
with several of the same high risk factors as child abuse, including young 
maternal age, siblings who have died under similar circumstances, lack of 
prenatal care and low birth weight. Id. In addition, “[t]he SIDS rate is 2 to 3 
times higher among African American and some American Indian 
populations.” Id. African American and American Indian children are also 
significantly more likely to suffer from maltreatment. CHILD MALTREATMENT 
1999, supra note 116, at 28 tbl.2-10. 
130 See Distinguishing SIDS, supra note 129, at 437. Shaken baby 
syndrome is the medical term used to describe the violent shaking and 
resulting injuries sustained from shaking. Id. 
131 See FACT SHEET, supra note 22. Child fatality review teams “are 
comprised of prosecutors, coroners and medical examiners, law enforcement 
personnel, CPS workers, public health care providers and others.” Id. “The 
teams review cases of child death and facilitate appropriate follow-up,” which 
may include support services for surviving family members and provide 
information necessary for prosecution of perpetrators. Id. They can also be 
instrumental in providing information and recommendations to local 
community support systems and CPS workers. Id. “Well designed, properly 
organized child fatality review teams appear to offer the greatest hope for 
defining the underlying nature and scope of fatalities due to child abuse and 
neglect and for offering solutions.” Id. 
132 Id. Five percent may be a conservative estimate. Task Force on Infant 
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passed mandatory autopsy statutes and thirty-two states had 
passed statutes mandating child death fatality review teams in the 
event of an unexplained death of a child under two years old.133 
In 2002, New York passed a law mandating autopsies in 
cases of unexplained deaths of all children under one year of 
age.134 Nevertheless, the state allows for child fatality review 
                                                          
Sleep and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Changing 
Concepts of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: Implications for Infant Sleeping 
Environment and Sleep Position, 105(3) PEDIATRICS 650 (2000). Some 
researchers believe that as many as ten percent of reported SIDS cases are, in 
fact, instances of infanticidal abuse. Id. 
133 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATE STATUTES 
ELEMENTS 1-2 (1999) [hereinafter State Statutes], available at 
http://www.calib.com/nccanch/pubs/stats00/cdrtaut.pdf. For example, the 
Illinois mandatory autopsy statute reads as follows: 
Where an infant under two years of age has died suddenly and 
unexpectedly and the circumstances surrounding the death are 
unexplained, an autopsy shall be performed by a physician licensed to 
practice medicine in all of its branches who has special training in 
pathology. When an autopsy is conducted under this Section, the 
parents or guardian of the child shall receive a preliminary report of 
the autopsy within five days of the infant’s death. 
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/3-3016 (West 1993). 
 The Virginia child fatality review teams statute reads in pertinent part: 
There is hereby created the State Child Fatality Review Team . . . [,] 
which shall develop and implement procedures to ensure that child 
deaths occurring in Virginia are analyzed in a systematic way. The 
team shall review (i) violent and unnatural deaths, (ii) sudden child 
deaths occurring within the first eighteen months of life, and (iii) 
those fatalities for which the cause or manner of death was not 
determined with reasonable medical certainty. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-283.1 (Michie 2002). 
134 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4210(2) (McKinney 2002).  
The commissioner shall adopt regulations to establish standard 
autopsy protocols for any person under the age of one year who dies 
under circumstances in which death is not anticipated by medical 
history or the cause is unknown. . . . In developing and implementing 
such regulations and protocols, the commissioner shall consult with 
health professionals, families and other persons participating in the 
implementation of the sudden infant death syndrome program. 
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teams to investigate the unexplained death of an infant only when 
a complaint has been lodged with the Central Registry on Child 
Abuse or when the child is in foster care at the time of her 
death.135 Thus, many child murders will likely remain 
undetected.136  
The National Clearinghouse believes that the five percent 
chance of finding a substantiated case of abuse is enough to 
warrant a complete investigation of all unexplained infant 
deaths.137 While this is the preferred solution, child fatality 
review teams can be resource-intensive, expensive and invasive 
of family privacy. At some point, the potential of discovering 
substantiated cases of fatal child abuse makes the investment cost-
effective both economically and personally.138 Since very young 
infants living with one genetic parent and a stepparent in the 
United States are up to one hundred times more likely to suffer 
fatal child abuse, New York should consider passing a statute 
requiring child fatality review teams in cases where the child is 
living with a biological parent and a non-biological adult in a 
parental role. This would significantly increase the state’s return 
                                                          
Id. 
135 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422-b (McKinney 1999).  
A fatality review team may be established at a local or regional level, 
with the approval of the office of children and family services, for the 
purpose of investigating the death of any child whose care and 
custody or custody and guardianship has been transferred to an 
authorized agency, or in the case of a report made to the central 
register involving the death of a child. 
Id. 
136 See THE CITY OF NEW YORK HUMAN RES. ADMIN., NEW YORK CITY 
CHILD FATALITY REVIEW PANEL, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1991 4 (1992). In 
1991, there were 102 child fatalities in New York City alone, and less than 
half were investigated by the child fatality review team. Id. More than half of 
the cases that were reviewed were substantiated as cases of infanticide. Id. 
137 See FACT SHEET, supra note 22. 
138 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1236-37. While Jones does 
not discuss this proposal specifically, he does clarify how evolutionary 
analysis can help improve cost-benefit analysis. Id. “Although evolutionary 
analysis generally says little about which goals society should favor, it can (as 
here) highlight previously unconsidered costs of legal and social policies.” Id. 
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on its investment. The proposed statute (hereinafter Proposed 
Child Fatality Review Team Statute), which would amend the 
current provision outlining the use of fatality review teams,139 
reads as follows: 
In the event of an unexplained death of an infant under 
one year old, where the infant resides with a biological 
parent and a non-biological adult, a child fatality review 
team will investigate the possibility of fatal child abuse. 
This investigation will be conducted regardless of the 
presence or absence of a complaint filed with the central 
register.140 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
A critic of evolutionary psychology, Professor Steven 
Goldberg, has said that “[t]he evolutionary evidence burdening [a 
stepparent] is a statement about stepparents generally. It is not a 
statement about him individually.”141 Commentators on both sides 
of the debate on the use of evolutionary thought in legal decision 
making have recognized that “[i]f evolutionary analysis ever has 
a direct impact on American law, it will be through statistical 
generalizations about human behavior rather than explanations of 
why a specific individual acted in a certain way.”142 While this 
contention is undisputed, Goldberg goes on to unfairly stack the 
deck.143 Goldberg cites a number of examples implying that the 
                                                          
 139 § 422-b. 
140 This proposal has not been made before, probably because the 
preferred solution is to authorize a child fatality review team to review all 
unexplained deaths. See supra text accompanying note 137. The New York 
legislature, however, has shown its willingness to split hairs, distinguishing 
between children in foster care and those in intact families. See § 422-b. 
Whether the legislature’s concern is financial or based on parental rights to 
privacy, the one hundred fold increased risk might be enough to shift the 
balance toward protecting children in this cost-benefit analysis. 
141 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 257. 
142 Id. at 255. 
143 Id. 
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use of statistical evidence is disfavored by the Supreme Court.144 
Goldberg offers these cases “not for their doctrinal significance, 
but to provide a general sense of the problems statistics, 
including evolutionary-based evidence, must overcome.”145 It is, 
however, precisely because of their doctrinal significance that the 
statistical evidence presented in those cases was rejected.146 In 
fact, there are no significant constitutional barriers to any of the 
proposed statutes. 
A. Fundamental Liberty Interest and Family Privacy 
First, a court will consider whether a fundamental liberty 
interest is implicated.147 If the proposed statutes substantially 
                                                          
144 Id. at 257-59. Criticizing the use of statistical evidence in legal 
decision making, Goldberg presents three examples of Supreme Court 
decisions where arguments based on that evidence have failed. Id. 
Specifically, he cites Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976) and McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Id. 
145 Goldberg, supra note 9, at 257. 
146 See Id. The author uses cases involving discrimination based on race 
and sex to make the point that distinctions between various groups are 
disfavored by the courts. Id. “Two disparate Supreme Court cases in which 
statistical arguments fare poorly, illustrate the hurdles evolutionary based 
evidence will face in the future.” Id. at 258. Elsewhere in his article, 
Goldberg concedes no court is likely to question most decisions based on 
statistical evidence, however his rhetorical use of clearly distinguishable cases 
is puzzling. Id. at 257. 
147 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.” Id. In a due process analysis, 
one must first define what liberty interest is affected before determining 
whether the interference is substantial. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 536 (1942). When due process claims arise in the context of an equal 
protection challenge, the intrusion need not rise to a level that would preclude 
all people from exercising the right. Id. at 540. Therefore, actions that would 
be constitutional if applied to all citizens may be unconstitutional when 
arbitrarily applied to one group over another. Id. Ironically, the consideration 
of due process issues in equal protection analysis was first applied in a 
eugenics case. See generally id. In Skinner, the Court held that a forced 
sterilization law was unconstitutional, not because the practice of mandatory 
sterilization of convicted felons without a hearing was a per se violation of due 
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interfere with a fundamental liberty interest, the courts would 
subject the statutes to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, a law 
would be struck down unless it is narrowly tailored to further a 
compelling state interest. Here the interests of both the biological 
parent and the stepparent must be considered. It is likely that a 
court would not recognize the existence of a fundamental liberty 
interest for stepparents, as has been recognized for biological and 
adoptive parents. Even if an interest similar to that of biological 
parents was recognized, however, it is unlikely that the modest 
proposals presented here would warrant strict scrutiny. 
1. Parents 
A biological and adoptive parent each has a protected liberty 
interest in the “companionship, care, custody and management of 
his or her children.”148 Any substantial interference with a 
biological parent’s fundamental liberty interest is subject to strict 
scrutiny.149 Even if stepparents have no familial rights, the 
fundamental liberty interest of biological parents may be 
infringed by substantial, unwarranted intrusions into family 
privacy. The biological parent is at least equally affected by an 
investigation into an allegation of abuse.150 Child abuse 
investigations do not, at least initially, focus on an individual 
                                                          
process, but because the arbitrary distinction between white collar and blue 
collar crimes violated equal protection when examined under a more intensive 
scrutiny. Id. at 540. Higher scrutiny was warranted because the liberty interest 
of procreative freedom was at stake. Id. Ultimately, the plaintiff was allowed a 
hearing before being involuntarily sterilized. Id. 
148 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that absent a 
finding of unfitness, an unwed father has a right to custody of his children 
without a hearing upon the death of the child’s mother); see also Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The “Constitution protects 
the sanctity of the family because the institution of the family is so deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and traditions.” Id. 
149 Moore, 431 U.S. at 499. 
150 See DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 34. DPST 
appears to suggest that biological parents would be even more disaffected, 
because a child abuse investigation potentially interrupts their closer 
relationship. Id. Ultimately, the biological parent has more to lose. Id. 
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suspect, but on the specific facts of the case.151 Therefore, the 
biological parent who chooses to remarry or cohabit with a new 
mate would have standing to make an equal protection claim 
against arbitrary state invasion in the care, custody and 
management of his or her child if that interference were 
substantial. 
2. Stepparents 
Most likely, courts would find that stepparents do not have 
the same fundamental liberty interest as a biological parent in the 
care, custody and management of their children.152 To establish 
the liberty interest, the step-relationship must satisfy the Supreme 
Court’s definition of “family.”153 The Court has only loosely 
defined the parameters of what constitutes a family and has not 
specifically determined whether stepparents are included.154 In 
fact, the First Circuit declined to extend the previously 
recognized parental liberty interest in “companionship of . . . 
children” to a stepparent absent Supreme Court precedent.155 
                                                          
151 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1238. Criticism from the 
social science community of the findings presented in this note has centered 
less on the objective findings that stepparent families present greater potential 
for abuse than the fact that stepparents are the perpetrators of that abuse. 
DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 1, at 51-52. Critics argue that 
child abuse investigations data available at the time is unreliable because it 
does not indicate the perpetrator was a stepparent even when it does indicate 
that the victim came from a stepparent family. Id. In either event, more 
intensive investigations into stepparent families as opposed to traditional 
families would still result in more substantiated cases of abuse, regardless of 
who is found to be the perpetrator. 
152 See Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (declining to extend 
parental rights to a stepparent, absent Supreme Court precedent). 
153 Id. at 504-06. 
154 Compare Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505-06 
(1977) (holding that a household composed of a grandparent and grandchild 
satisfies the requirements of zoning ordinances requiring family status), with 
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 
(1977) (holding that foster parents do not possess the parental liberty interest 
of biological parents). 
155 Ortiz, 807 F.2d at 6. “Some Supreme Court cases acknowledging the 
MARLBOROUGHMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:10 PM 
 EVOLUTION AND CHILD ABUSE 721 
First, because a stepparent’s familial rights remain an open 
question, it may be helpful to examine what is and is not a family 
for constitutional purposes. Several decisions defining what 
triggers the rights of family have stressed the biological nature of 
the relationship.156 The Court has noted, “The significance of the 
biological connection is that it offers the natural father an 
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship 
with his offspring.”157 Grandparents and extended biological 
relations receive some constitutional protection in the absence of 
a competing biological parent’s interest.158 Foster parents have 
                                                          
personal liberty interest of parents in the ‘companionship, care, custody, and 
management of his or her children,’ suggest that this right may extend only to 
natural parents.” Id. (citation omitted). “Our conclusion is simply that, in light 
of the limited nature of the Supreme Court precedent in this area, it would be 
inappropriate to extend recognition of an individual’s liberty interest in his or 
her family or parental relationship to the facts of this case.” Id. at 10. 
156 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06. “[T]he choice of relatives in this 
degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the state.” Id. 
(emphasis added); see also Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 
431 U.S. at 843. “The usual understanding of families implies biological 
relationships and most decisions treating the relationship between parent and 
child have stressed this element.” Id. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110 (1989). Michael H. provides an exception to the Court’s preference for 
biology and demonstrated commitment in establishing parental rights. Id. In 
Michael H., a genetic father who had established a parental relationship with 
the child was denied an order of filiation when the child in question was born 
to a woman married to another man. Id. The Court determined that there is no 
fundamental right available to an unwed father in such a case, noting the 
absence of such a right at common law. Id. at 125-26. 
157 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (holding that a 
biological father who takes an active role in his child’s life is entitled to 
constitutional interest in the care, custody and management of his children, but 
absent that demonstrated commitment, no such liberty interest is recognized). 
158 See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-06. In Moore, the Court held that a 
zoning ordinance could not arbitrarily define the standards of what constitutes 
a family and consequently prohibit a grandmother from living with her 
grandchildren. Id. at 499-502. For the first time, the Court extended the 
definition “family” beyond the traditional, nuclear family. Id. In doing so, 
however, the Court repeatedly emphasized the significance of the biological 
relationship. Id. at 503-04. “The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and 
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and 
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been specifically denied parental privileges when the competing 
interest of a biological parent is present.159 Stepparent relations 
arguably fall somewhere in between biological grandparents and 
foster parents.160 While no biological relationship exists between 
a stepparent and stepchild, there may be more potential for 
permanency in a stepparent relationship than in a foster care 
situation, where the relationship results from a contractual 
relationship with the state.161 
                                                          
children . . . is equally deserving of constitutional recognition,” when 
compared to biological parents. Id. at 504. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246 (1978) (making no attempt to consider the rights of the adoptive 
stepparent, while holding that the natural father had no right to veto a 
stepparent adoption, since he had not taken an active role in the child’s life 
prior to the adoption proceeding). But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 
(2001) (striking down an Oregon statute that afforded special rights to 
grandparents in visitation of children against the biological parents’ wishes). 
 In general, when there are competing interests, a biological parent’s 
liberty interest trumps those of a grandparent. Id. The cases defining what 
constitutes a family often make for a difficult comparison to the proposed 
statutes because, like the visitation statute in Troxel, the party seeking 
substantive rights may be in conflict with a biological parent. See Org. of 
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 846. 
159 Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 845-46 
(denying a foster parent the same protections that parents and grandparents 
receive when removing a child from the foster home in order to return the 
child to the natural parent). One “consideration related to this [decision] is that 
ordinarily procedural protection may be afforded to a liberty interest of one 
person without derogating from the substantive liberty of another. Here, 
however, such a tension is virtually unavoidable.” Id. at 846. “Whatever 
liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that 
interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed removal from the 
foster family is to return the child to his natural parents.” Id. 
160 See text accompanying note 159. 
161 See Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 845. 
There is an “important distinction” between the foster family and the 
natural family. . . . [U]nlike the earlier cases recognizing a right to 
family privacy, the State here seeks to interfere, not with a 
relationship having its origins entirely apart from the power of the 
State, but rather with a foster family which has its source in state law 
and contractual arrangements. 
Id. 
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In addition, the court has noted that a fundamental liberty 
interest may derive from rights or obligations granted under state 
law.162 Nevertheless, no state, including New York, has a 
particularly expansive view of stepparent rights from which an 
interest in the care, custody and management of one’s 
stepchildren would likely emerge.163 
Finally, in determining stepparent rights, a court might 
                                                          
162 See id. at 844 n.51 (citing New York State law for the proposition that 
“adoption is the legal equivalent of biological parenthood”); Harper v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 (1966) (holding that there 
is not necessarily a constitutional right to vote in state elections but that, 
nevertheless, “once the franchise is granted to the electorate [by the state], 
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
163 MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 6 (1994) 
(“The legal system has failed to recognize, on any consistent basis, that the 
relationship between stepchild and stepparent entails any enforceable rights 
and duties.”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 70-71 (McKinney 2003) (allowing 
court-ordered visitation to biological parents and siblings); N.Y. SOC. SERV. 
LAW § 101 (McKinney 2003) (limiting a stepparent’s obligation of support to a 
stepchild to situations where the child would otherwise require public 
assistance and that even an adoptive stepparent has no obligation of support if 
living separate and apart from his/her spouse and stepchild); Alison D. v. 
Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that, unlike many other 
states, a “biological stranger” lacks standing to request visitation in New 
York); Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (App. Div. 2000) (following 
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2001), and holding N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 72, New York’s grandparent visitation statute, unconstitutional). The same 
limited view applies in the law regarding inheritance. See In re Peer’s Estate, 
245 N.Y.S. 298 (Sur. Ct. 1930), aff’d, 249 N.Y.S. 900 (App. Div. 1930) 
(holding that stepchildren inherit only if decedent leaves no next of kin.). The 
statute upon which Peer’s Estate was based, however, has since been 
repealed, removing any potential for an unadopted stepchild to inherit through 
intestacy. See MAHONEY, supra, at 57 n.14. New York is not one of the four 
states that recognize a stepchild’s right to recover in wrongful death suits. Id. 
at 103. New York recognizes worker’s compensation survivor benefits for 
stepchildren, but not stepparents. Id. at 116 n.8. New York does, however, 
recognize some limited rights for stepparents. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 
(Mckinney 2003) (recognizing stepparent adoption as all other states do); 
Rosenberg v. Silver, 762 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a stepfather is 
entitled to parental tort immunity if he can establish in loco parentis 
relationship to his stepchild.). 
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choose to consider a stepparent’s efforts to be a substantial part 
of the child’s life, the amount of time spent in the home and the 
permanency of the relationship.164 This “psychological parent” 
argument has failed twice before the Court, although both cases 
involved competing interests between biological parents and more 
remotely related or unrelated caretakers.165 “[T]he importance of 
                                                          
164 See Drummond v. Fulton County Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 
835 (5th Cir. 1977). The court recognized the liberty interest of a pair of 
foster parents in the adoption of their foster child based on psychological 
parent theory. Id. The court noted the close relationship the foster parents had 
developed with the child over the five years the child had been living with 
them. Id. at 857. Under procedural due process, the foster parents were 
allowed a hearing before they could be denied an opportunity to adopt. Id. 
This case was decided shortly before the Supreme Court spoke on the issue 
and relied in part on the circuit court opinion in Org. of Foster Families for 
Equality and Reform case to the same effect. See Org. of Foster Families for 
Equal. & Reform v. Dumpson, D.C., 418 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
rev’d, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
165 See Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 847 
n.54. The Court noted that both litigants discussed the validity of the 
“psychological parent” theory in their briefs. Id. Without determining the 
theory’s validity, the Court rejected its relevance in determining the legal 
relationship of a foster parent to a foster child. Id. at 845 n.52. The Court 
recognized the “undisputed fact that the emotional ties between foster parent 
and foster child are in many cases quite close, and undoubtedly in some as 
close as those existing in biological families.” Id.; See also Troxel, 530 U.S. 
at 91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). “Cases are sure to arise—perhaps a substantial 
number of cases—in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a 
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is 
not necessarily subject to absolute parental veto.” Id. at 98. While this 
argument was not accepted by the majority, Troxel involved conflicting 
interests between grandparents asserting their rights to visitation and biological 
parents, whose interests clearly trump those of grandparents. Id. 
 The Court’s rulings in a line of paternity cases may also be instructive on 
this point. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (finding that 
by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, a putative father’s 
continued interest in the custody of his children warrants protection), with 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 
248 (1983) (declining to find the same right in a putative father who did not 
make attempts to involve himself in the child’s life before attempts were made 
to terminate his parental rights). When a non-custodial biological father 
attempts to assert paternity rights, courts require not only a biological 
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the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to 
society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from 
the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in 
‘[promoting] a way of life’ through the instruction of 
children.”166 This argument may be more viable when a 
stepparent’s claim is not in conflict with the biological parent’s 
wishes.167 
The distinction between different kinds of “stepparents” as 
broadly defined in this note becomes increasingly important if 
contributions to the child’s well-being are considered. A 
stepparent who has legally adopted his stepchild would be in the 
best position to invoke the liberty interest because adoptive 
parents are treated as biological parents under the law.168 In 
                                                          
relationship, but also parental contributions to the quality of the child’s life. 
“In some circumstances the actual relationship between father and child may 
suffice to create in the unwed father parental interests comparable to those of 
the married father.” Lehr, 434 U.S. at 260. In these cases, however, a 
biological relationship was present or presumed. 
166 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 261). 
167 See Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. at 846. 
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest 
against arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like 
associations into which they have freely entered, even in the absence 
of biological connection or state-law recognition of the relationship. It 
is quite another to say that individuals may acquire such an interest in 
the face of another’s constitutionally recognized liberty interest that 
derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human 
right . . . . 
Id. 
168 Id. at 845 n.51. “Adoption . . . is recognized as the legal equivalent of 
biological parenthood.” Id.; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2003) 
(defining “adoption” as “the legal proceeding whereby a person takes another 
person into the relation of child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the 
responsibilities of [a] parent in respect of such other person”). A person may 
adopt the child of his spouse without terminating the parental rights of his 
spouse. Id. “Approximately one-half of all adoptions are by relatives, defined 
to include stepparents.” MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE 
LAW 161 n.1 (1994). “Through such an adoption, the stepfamily is 
transformed from [an] uncertain legal entity . . . into a legal family.” Id. at 
161. 
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contrast, one who is simply married to the child’s mother might 
be less likely to receive constitutional recognition as family.169 A 
live-in boyfriend would be unlikely to have a right in the “care, 
custody and management” of his girlfriend’s children. 
3. Substantial Interference 
Even if stepparents were granted all of the rights of a 
biological parent, the level of interference with a stepparent’s 
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management 
of his or her stepchildren must be substantial in order for strict 
scrutiny to apply. While the collection of anonymous data does 
not interfere with individual family privacy, the Proposed Risk 
Assessment and Proposed Child Fatality Review Team statutes 
warrant further examination.170 
Any interference in family privacy caused by the Proposed 
Risk Assessment Statute is de minimis.171 In the context of child 
abuse investigations, this liberty interest is most often invoked 
when the termination of parental rights are at stake.172 The 
                                                          
169 See Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (declining to extend 
constitutional liberty interest to a stepparent). But see Gribble v. Gribble 583 
P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). In Gribble, the Supreme Court of Utah determined that a 
stepparent requesting court-ordered visitation was entitled to a hearing as to 
whether he stood “in loco parentis” to a child against the wishes of the 
biological parent. Id. at 66. If found to be in loco parentis, the plaintiff would 
be entitled to all of the rights and obligations of a parent and child, even 
without a formal adoption. Id. As a case of non-parental visitation rights, it 
appears that this decision is no longer good law under Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57 (2001), which declared that when competing interests between 
biological parents and others are at stake, the parental rights supercede those 
of a biological stranger or even a grandparent. See generally Gribble, 583 
P.2d 64. Absent a competing parental interest, however, the argument may 
still have some vitality. 
170 Data collection would involve no personally identifiable information 
and would compile merely demographic data, therefore no individual liberties 
are infringed. 
171 See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (refusing to scrutinize a 
state’s decision to take temporary custody of children whose parents were 
suspected of child abuse). 
172 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 755 (1982) (holding that the Due 
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proposed statute would serve to prioritize an inevitable 
investigation or, at most, trigger a more thorough 
investigation.173 This is, however, a long way from the 
termination or suspension of parental custody, which requires a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence of parental guilt.174 
The analysis of the Proposed Child Fatality Review Team 
Statute is much the same as in the Proposed Risk Assessment 
Statute, but strict scrutiny is even less applicable in the context of 
fatality review teams. First, since most cases reviewed by child 
fatality review teams involve very young children, a truly 
committed stepparent may not be able to accrue enough time in 
the child’s life to prove that commitment to a court and be treated 
as a parent.175 Second, there is no fundamental liberty interest at 
stake, even for a biological parent,176 as the death of the child 
terminates the interest in protecting the care, custody and 
management of that child.177 The Fifth Circuit specifically 
                                                          
Process Clause requires a clear and convincing evidentiary standard in order 
to terminate parental rights, but also noting the profound significance of the 
state’s interference into a family’s privacy when it seeks to terminate those 
rights). “When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it 
seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it.” 
Id. at 759. 
173 See Sims, 442 U.S. 415. 
174 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. 
175 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 53 tbl.5-1. In 
2000, more than seventy percent of all fatality victims of child maltreatment 
were under three years old. Id. 
 While the paternity cases require a biological father’s “attempt” to 
become a substantial part of a child’s life, the psychological parent theory is 
concerned with the actual bond that has developed between the child and the 
substitute. See Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). “In 
light of the fact that the record does not disclose . . . the extent to which their 
foster parents have become their psychological parents during the last three 
years, we are hard pressed to determine who would be most harmed by the 
denial of custody.” Id. 
176 See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1989). The court noted 
that recognizing a constitutionally protected interest in a deceased infant’s 
remains would be more than an extension or interpretation of any preexisting 
right, but a new liberty interest altogether. Id. at 311. 
177 Id; see also In re Stephanie WW, 623 N.Y.S.2d 404 (3d Dep’t 1995) 
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declined to recognize “a liberty interest in the next of kin to be 
free from state-occasioned mutilation of the body of a deceased 
relative.”178 
B. Protected Classes 
Strict or intermediate scrutiny may also be applied when a 
law discriminates against suspect classes, including race, 
alienage, national origin and sex. The proposed statutes do not 
discriminate against any of these classes in a manner that would 
trigger heightened scrutiny.  
                                                          
(holding that although a neglect action could not be brought on behalf of a 
dead child, the child’s death could be used to substantiate a neglect action 
brought on behalf of her surviving sister). 
178 Arnaud, 870 F.2d at 305. Arnaud involved both a SIDS death and a 
resulting autopsy required by a mandatory autopsy statute. Id. The plaintiff 
parent was not challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory autopsy 
itself, but whether the coroner’s performance of “gruesome experiments” on 
the infant’s corpse (that clearly exceeded his authority) in preparation for 
expert testimony in an unrelated case, violated a substantive due process right 
of the plaintiff. Id. The court rejected the argument that the child’s parents had 
a liberty interest in their deceased child’s remains, but found that the parents 
had a “quasi-property” right in their child’s corpse, allowing them the 
potential to recover in tort. Id. at 309. 
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1. Strict Scrutiny and Racial Discrimination179 
Professor Goldberg cites the case of Palmore v. Sidoti as 
analogous to the issues of child abuse prevention presented in this 
note.180 Palmore, however, involved a suspect classification 
based on race and was subject to strict scrutiny.181 When a court 
                                                          
179 See Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986). “It is 
well established that where a law classifies by race, alienage or national 
origin, and where a law classifies in such a way as to infringe constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights, heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause is required.” Id. 
These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any 
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the 
burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these 
reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon 
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict 
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest. 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
180 See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 256; Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 
(1984). Jones points out that a supporter of evolutionary biology in law might 
favor targeting stepparents for child abuse prevention and education programs. 
By way of analogy, it was plausible to argue, as a Florida court did in 1982, 
that an interracial couple should not be granted custody of a white child 
because racial prejudice would make life difficult for the child. But the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the law should not tolerate such 
prejudice. Id. 
181 Palmore, 466 U.S. 429. In Palmore, the Supreme Court applied strict 
scrutiny and overruled a judge’s custody determination in favor of the child’s 
father based solely on the fact that the child’s white mother was cohabitating 
with a black man. Id. The court rejected the argument that the racial 
distinction was appropriate because the child would be subject to increased 
risk of suffering from racial prejudice. Id. at 431. The reasoning of the trial 
court was that there are social consequences for children in an interracial 
family and that the child would be subject to discrimination by society. Id. The 
Supreme Court recognized the potential that the child may suffer from these 
pressures, but determined under strict scrutiny that the justification was 
insufficient to warrant such a profound intrusion. Id. “The effects of racial 
prejudice, however real, cannot justify a racial classification removing an 
infant child from the custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate 
person to have such custody.” Id. at 434. “The Constitution cannot control 
MARLBOROUGHMACROX.DOC 6/25/03 5:10 PM 
730 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
applies strict scrutiny, it almost invariably strikes down the 
law.182 Undoubtedly, if strict scrutiny were applied to the 
proposed statutes in this note they would be deemed 
unconstitutional.183 Race, alienage and national origin 
classifications, however, are not implicated by the proposed 
statutes, and stepparents are not a suspect class; therefore, strict 
scrutiny would not be triggered.184 
                                                          
such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them.” Id. at 433. 
182 Gerald Gunther, Foreward: A Search for Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1972) (coining the oft-repeated phrase that strict scrutiny is “strict in 
theory and fatal in fact”). But see Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“dispel[ling] the notion that strict scrutiny is strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact”); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944) (applying strict scrutiny and upholding the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II because the action was narrowly tailored to 
the Government’s purported compelling interest in national security).  
183 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432. A law that is overinclusive or 
underinclusive will not be upheld when this standard is applied. Id. A law is 
overinclusive to the extent it affects more people than necessary to serve the 
government’s interest. See Craig v. Boren, 423 U.S. 1047 (1976) (holding that 
a different drinking age for men and women is overinclusive because it 
disaffects drinkers who don’t drive). A law is underinclusive to the extent that 
it does not reach every person necessary to serve the governmental purpose. 
Id. (holding that the same law is underinclusive because it does not address all 
drunk drivers including older drunk drivers and female drunk drivers). The 
proposed statutes in this note are overinclusive to the extent that they would 
target stepparent families where there is no abuse and underinclusive to the 
extent that they would not target every instance of child abuse. 
184 See Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology, Behavior and Criminal Law: 
Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange, 22 VT. L. REV. 
263, 282-84 (1997). It is unlikely that proposals for race-based distinctions 
will come from the field of evolutionary psychology at all. First, evolutionary 
psychology looks at the human species as a whole and not at the differences 
between individuals or groups within the species (except for sex-based 
differences). Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1120. In addition, the 
scientific consensus indicates that race is largely a social construct. 
Goodenough, supra, at 283. The physical differences between the races are 
primarily specific adaptations to local climate, disease and diet. Id.; Nina 
Jablonski & George Chaplin, Skin Deep, SCI. AM., Oct. 2002, 75, 75-81 
(explaining the mechanics of skin color evolution). Theorists believe that dark 
skin evolved in sunnier parts of the globe either as a natural sunscreen to 
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2. Quasi-Suspect Class and Sex Discrimination185 
Additionally, Goldberg cites Craig v. Boren as an example of 
                                                          
prevent skin cancer or to prevent the breakdown of vitamin B folate, which is 
important for reproductive processes. Id. Lighter skin evolved in areas with 
little sunlight in order to absorb more ultraviolet radiation and maximize 
vitamin D production. Id. at 79. 
 Goodenough points out that science and the law have independently 
reached the same conclusion: distinctions based on racial classifications are 
inherently suspect. Goodenough, supra, at 284. “‘[S]cientific explanations’ 
stigmatizing persons according to their race or ethnicity are much more likely 
to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate scientific activity.” Id. 
185 Craig, 429 U.S. 190. An intermediate level of scrutiny is applied to 
cases involving legal distinctions based on sex. Id. For discrimination based 
on sex, a law must be sufficiently related to an important government interest 
in order to withstand intermediate scrutiny. Id. The court’s rationale for this 
rule is that laws discriminating on the basis of sex are “inherently suspect” 
because sex “frequently bears no relation to ability to contribute to society,” 
and legal distinctions based on sex often “reflect outmoded notions of the 
relative capabilities of men and women.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1973)). The Court recognizes that men and women do have some 
biological differences that might be relevant to law and, therefore, the test is 
not as stringent as strict scrutiny. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape law that criminalized 
sex with females but not males under the age of 18). Much like evolutionary 
theories have noted with regard to sexual selection, the Court recognized that 
the burdens of teen pregnancy fall disproportionately on females. Id. at 471. 
“We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women 
are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual 
intercourse. Id. The Court “has consistently upheld statutes where the gender 
classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the 
sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.” Id. at 465. See also 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down an Illinois law that 
allowed illegitimate children to inherit in intestacy only from their mothers but 
not from their unwed fathers even if they could prove paternity). “The more 
serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding 
standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ estates than that 
required . . . under their mothers’ estates.” Id. at 770. “Fathers and mothers 
are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. 
The imposition of a different set of rules for making that legal determination 
with respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from 
a constitutional perspective.” Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 553 U.S. 53, 63 
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the failure of statistical evidence under constitutional scrutiny.186 
In Craig, however, the discrimination was based on the quasi-
suspect class of gender and subjected to intermediate scrutiny.187 
Statistical evidence has a poor track record under intermediate 
scrutiny.188 While sex based classifications can potentially arise 
                                                          
(2001). Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68 (upholding a New York statutory scheme 
that gave mothers of children born out of wedlock notice of an adoption 
hearing, but only extended that right to fathers who mailed a postcard to a 
putative fathers registry). 
186 See Craig, 429 U.S. 190; Goldberg, supra note 9, at 258. In Craig, 
the Court examined an Oklahoma statute that established a drinking age of 
eighteen for women and twenty-one for men (for beer with low alcohol 
content). Id. at 190. Oklahoma based its legislative decision on the state’s 
interest in traffic safety and statistical evidence that men were more likely to 
be arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 200, 222. In a 7-2 decision, the Court 
struck down the statute, finding that the law invidiously discriminated against 
men and violated the male plaintiff’s guarantee of equal protection. Id. “Even 
where this statistical evidence is accepted as accurate, it offers only a weak 
answer to the equal protection questions presented here.” Id. at 201. The 
Court emphasized both the overinclusive nature of the prohibition, referring to 
the fact that a significant number of men are not arrested for drunk driving, 
and underinclusiveness, because the statute applied only to males between 
eighteen and twenty-one, even though the drunk driving statistics considered 
by the Court included men of all ages. Id. While the majority applied 
intermediate scrutiny, both dissenting opinions applied the rational basis test. 
Id. at 217, 220-21. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the statute in 
question was not based on prejudice but emphasized the fact that men are 
much more likely to be arrested for drunk driving. Id. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). This suggests that the level of scrutiny was critical to the 
majority’s decision. 
187 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 199. 
188 See generally id. at 208-09 (“The principles embodied in the Equal 
Protection Clause are not to be rendered inapplicable by statistically measured 
but loose-fitting generalities concerning the . . . tendencies of aggregate 
groups.”); see also Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (“[O]verbroad sex-
based generalizations are impermissible even though they enjoy empirical 
support.”); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
Obviously, the notion that men are more likely to be the primary 
supporters of their spouses is not entirely without empirical support. 
But such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the 
denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings 
contribute significantly to their families’ support. 
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from the field of evolutionary psychology, that is not the case 
here.189 The proposed statutes do not facially discriminate on the 
basis of sex.190 Stepparents are not a quasi-suspect class and are 
unlikely to be deemed so in the future.191 One could argue that 
                                                          
Id. at 646. 
189 As evidenced by the discussion regarding sexual selection and 
reproductive access theory in Part I of this note, evolutionary theories 
sometimes distinguish between men and women based on the different 
environmental pressures present for each sex. Some notable differences 
include sexual dimorphism, hormonal differences, the relative size of certain 
brain structures and behavioral differences. See Goodenough, supra note 184, 
at 285-86. Nonetheless, the dangers of reinforcing stereotypes to the detriment 
of both men and women are real and significant. Id. at 285. Goodenough 
posits that the law strikes a reasonable compromise. Id. at 287. “We should 
cautiously explore the scope of the enduring gender differences, while taking 
care to avoid denigration and artificial constraints on both men and women.” 
Id. 
190 See Proposed Data Collection Statute, supra text accompanying note 
119; Proposed Risk Assessment Statute, supra text accompanying note 128; 
Proposed Child Fatality Review Team Statute, supra text accompanying note 
140. 
191 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 452 
(1985) (indicating the Court’s reluctance to define new quasi-suspect classes). 
While a number of disaffected groups have sought the advantages of being 
considered a suspect class, none have been successful. Id. 
[I]t would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety 
of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them 
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired 
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice 
from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this 
respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. 
We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so. 
Id. at 446. 
 In Cleburne, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s determination that 
mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classification and that plaintiff’s equal 
protection claim warranted intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 438. See also Maher 
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470 (1977) (holding that indigent women’s claim 
contesting a state policy that refused to publicly fund abortions was not entitled 
to heightened scrutiny of the policy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996) (denying suspect class status to homosexuals). For a brief period of 
time, the Ninth Circuit held that homosexuals were a suspect class in a case 
involving the military’s discrimination against homosexuals. Watkins v. U.S. 
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the proposed statute results in sex discrimination, since the 
overwhelming majority of stepparents residing with young 
stepchildren are male.192 In cases of disparate impact, however, 
                                                          
Army, 847 F.2d. 1329 (1989) That decision was quickly vacated by the full 
circuit. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 731 (1989), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 957 (1990). 
 The Supreme Court has looked at a number of factors in determining 
whether a group should receive protected status, including a history of 
purposeful discrimination, immutability of the trait in question, and whether 
that class is a “discrete and insular minority” unable to rally its own political 
support. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (discussing 
the history of discrimination and immutability requirements in establishing sex 
to be a suspect classification); U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
153 n.4 (1938). “[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which 
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”Id. 
Stepparents are not prime candidates for the protections of heightened 
scrutiny. First, stepparents have not had the kind of purposeful discrimination 
relevant for consideration. But see DALY & WILSON, CINDERELLA, supra note 
1, at 1-8, 21-25 (noting historical prejudice and distrust of stepparents). 
Despite the fact that stepparents may be viewed suspiciously by some, they 
have not been subject to the same institutional discrimination as women, racial 
minorities, or even other groups that have been denied suspect class status, 
such as the mentally retarded. Second, stepparenthood is not an immutable 
trait. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (denying suspect class 
status to undocumented aliens and finding that undocumented alien status is 
not an immutable characteristic because it is the product of conscious action). 
Id. Unlike race and gender, stepparents can change their status at any time by 
leaving a relationship or adopting a child (when the biological father has 
waived or lost his parental rights). Third, stepparents are not a discrete and 
insular minority. In fact, many states have shown special consideration to 
custodial stepparents in relation to both visitation and adoption rights. See, 
e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2001) (striking down a 
Washington state statute that afforded special rights to grandparents in their 
visitation of children against the biological parents’ wishes). In New York, 
before 1995, stepparents were the only individuals who could adopt a child 
without terminating the other (opposite sex) parent’s parental rights. See N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2003). The New York Court of Appeals 
has since afforded the same rights to non-marital couples. In re Jacob, 660 
N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). 
192 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1995 64 tbl.77 (1996). Census Data 
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the court will rarely inquire beyond a rational basis test.193 If a 
statute is neutral on its face, a court will inquire further only 
when a clear pattern emerges that can only be explained as 
                                                          
indicates that ninety-two percent of children living with stepparents reside with 
a biological mother and a male stepparent. Id. Here a stepparent is defined in 
the traditional sense of an unrelated person married to the child’s parent. Id. 
Considering that the mandatory autopsy statute would affect only children 
under two years old, the percentage of stepfathers in households with children 
of nursing age may be much higher than households with older children. See 
Daly & Wilson, Nepotistic Discrimination, supra note 9, at 289. While the 
anonymous data collection does not discriminate based on sex at all, 
implementation of the Proposed Child Fatality Review Team Statute and (to a 
lesser extent) the Proposed Risk Assessment Statute may disproportionately 
affect males more than females. 
193 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McClesky, the 
plaintiff argued that his death sentence violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because the death sentence is more often imposed on black defendants 
convicted of killing white victims than on white defendants convicted of killing 
black victims. Id. The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny and held that “a 
defendant alleging an equal protection violation has the burden of proving 
purposeful discrimination” in his particular case. Id. at 291-92. Goldberg 
presents McClesky as an example of yet another failure of statistical evidence. 
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 258. The case is a better example of how disparate 
impact of a protected class is insufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny and 
how the Court will defer to the legislature in most cases when heightened 
scrutiny is inapplicable. See McClesky, 481 U.S. 279. 
 For the rare instances where higher scrutiny is involved, compare 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to 
determine if a police exam was racially discriminatory because more blacks 
than whites passed), with Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking 
down a law requiring laundry permits for wooden laundries when all but one 
white applicant was granted a permit and all 200 Chinese applicants were 
denied), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, at 340 (1960) (striking 
down a racial gerrymandering scheme that changed the boundaries of a city 
“from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure” that excluded 395 of 
the 400 black citizens from the city without excluding a single white person). 
The latter two examples are instances of de facto discrimination and represent 
“the rare cases in which a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact 
demonstrated a constitutional violation.” McClesky, 481 U.S. at 294. In these 
cases, statistical proof must present a “stark” pattern in order to overcome the 
standard rule of deference to legislative decisions. Id. at 293. 
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discriminatory intent against the protected class.194 Stepparents 
would not be distinguished by the fact that they may be male but 
because of the increased risk of abuse that their presence presents 
to their infant stepchildren.195 
3. Rational Basis Scrutiny and Everything Else 
One broad group of cases that are conspicuously absent from 
Goldberg’s analysis are the vast majority of opinions construing 
legislative decisions based on statistical evidence that do not 
substantially interfere with a fundamental liberty interest or 
disaffect a suspect class.196 In such cases, courts will apply a 
“rational basis test” and generally uphold a law in deference to 
the legislature.197 Under this test, a law will be upheld if it bears 
a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest, 
                                                          
194 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252 (1977) (upholding administrative decision refusing a zoning 
reclassification request that had a racially discriminatory impact and holding 
that a racially motivated purpose must also be behind the law). 
195 See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 27, at 88. In fact, some 
of the strongest advocates for better recognition of this fact come from fathers’ 
rights organizations. See Fathers for Life, Child Abuse and Neglect Data at 
the National Clearinghouse, Health Canada, at http://fatherless.net/Sodhi/ 
cancan1.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). Fathers for Life contends that the 
National Clearinghouse on Family Violence (in Canada) presents distorted and 
inaccurate information to promote their political agenda, ignoring the greater 
risk of children in stepparent families. Id. By combining statistics for 
biological male parents and substitute male parents, the National 
Clearinghouse reports a greater overall percentage of abuse perpetrated by 
male parents. Id. See also, Dads Against the Divorce Industry, The Human 
Carnage of Fatherlessness, at http://www.dadi.org/carnage.htm. (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2003). 
196 See Goldberg, supra note 9. Although these cases would more 
accurately represent “the constitutional hurdles . . . statistical evidence must 
overcome,” those hurdles are easily surmounted. Id at 258-59. 
197 Id. “[L]egislatures are presumed to have acted within their 
constitutional power, despite the fact that in practice the law results in some 
inequality.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s Sunday Blue Laws under rational basis 
scrutiny). 
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provided it is not motivated solely by invidious discrimination or 
a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.198 When the 
rational basis test is applied, most legislation, including 
legislation based on statistical evidence, is upheld.199 The rational 
basis test applies to all of the proposed statutes. 
                                                          
198 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(rejecting heightened scrutiny for the mentally retarded, but striking down a 
zoning ordinance under rational basis scrutiny that was motivated by a bare 
desire to harm); see also Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (rejecting heightened 
scrutiny for homosexuals as a class, but striking down a statewide voter 
referendum prohibiting protections for homosexuals from discrimination under 
rational basis scrutiny). 
199 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). In 
Williamson, the Court upheld a state law preventing opticians from fitting old 
lenses into new frames without a prescription from an opthamologist or 
optometrist. Id. In deference to the legislature, the Court noted that the “law 
may exact a needless wasteful requirement in many cases, but it is for the 
legislature not the courts to balance the advantages and disadvantages of 
the . . . requirement.” Id. at 487. See also New York City Transit Auth. v. 
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Beazer provides a prime example of the 
successful use of statistical evidence under rational basis review. Id. In 
Beazer, the Supreme Court ruled that the Transit Authority (TA) employment 
policy of refusing to hire methadone users was constitutional under rational 
basis scrutiny. Id. The court noted that the recidivism rate for methadone users 
in treatment was high and that the law was overinclusive to the extent that it 
refused consideration for employment to “the strong majority” of methadone 
users who would neither return to illicit drug use nor pose a threat to job 
safety. Id. at 576. “The ‘no drugs’ policy now enforced by the TA is 
supported by the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program . . . 
continues, a degree of uncertainty persists.” Id. at 591. “No matter how 
unwise it may be for [the] TA to refuse employment to individual [applicants] 
simply because they are receiving methadone treatment, the Constitution does 
not authorize a federal court to interfere with that policy decision.” Id. at 594. 
 Goldberg appears to acknowledge the Beazer decision, though not by 
name. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 257. Specifically, he notes, “When we 
consider educational attainment in awarding a job or a history of drug abuse in 
denying one, we are in part relying on a statistical prediction about who is 
more likely to be a successful worker. Yet no court is likely to set aside our 
decision.” Id. While this case did not warrant a citation as a case exemplifying 
“the hurdles statistics, including evolutionary-based evidence, must 
overcome,” cases involving race and sex discrimination received a more 
thorough analysis. Id. at 258-59. 
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a. Proposed Data Collection Statute Under the Rational Basis 
Test 
Challenges to data collection are invariably scrutinized under 
the rational basis test even when the protected classes of race and 
sex are involved.200 Courts consistently recognize the 
government’s broad discretionary powers to conduct research.201 
The National Clearinghouse already collects data on the sex of 
perpetrators and victims of child abuse, and the statute would do 
nothing to alter this practice.202 By collecting more accurate 
                                                          
200 See Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ. New York, 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 
1978). For example, the U.S. Census Bureau has been collecting racial data 
since its inception in 1790 and it has withstood numerous constitutional 
challenges under rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Morales v. Daley, 116 F. 
Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000). In Morales, the plaintiff argued that the U.S. 
Census questions pertaining to race were discriminatory on their face and that 
the tracking of racial statistics was a violation of equal protection under strict 
scrutiny. Id. In addition to the recognition of racial classification as a per se 
violation of equal protection, the plaintiffs claimed that census data was 
inappropriately used to identify Japanese-Americans for internment. Id. at 
811. The Morales court granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment and noted that the potential for misuse of otherwise legally 
obtainable information does create an equal protection violation. Id. at 814. 
“Plaintiff’s position is based on a misunderstanding of the distinction between 
collecting demographic data so that the government may have the information 
it believes at a given time it needs in order to govern, and government use of 
suspect classifications without a compelling interest.” Id.; see also Wisconsin 
v. New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996) (rejecting the state’s argument that a decision 
of the Secretary of Commerce to apply one statistical method in enumerating 
the census in favor of another should be reviewed applying strict scrutiny 
because the decision had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities). 
201 See supra note 199 (discussing applicable case law). 
202 See CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 25, 47. Although 
the report contains a fair amount of data on the demographics of perpetrators 
of child abuse that mirrors the demographics of the victims (age, economic 
status, etc.), data on the race of the perpetrator of child maltreatment is not 
included. Id. This may have resulted from a policy choice by the government. 
Another such choice may be reflected in the latest publication of Child 
Maltreatment, which obfuscates the racial data of victims by not comparing 
the incidence of maltreatment with the racial demographics of the general 
population. Compare CHILD MALTREATMENT 2000, supra note 21, at 26, with 
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information, the data collection statute does not disaffect 
individual stepparents. In fact, if the preliminary studies 
mentioned throughout this note are inaccurate, more extensive 
data on the subject could serve to vindicate stepparents. The 
statute merely allows the National Clearinghouse to gather 
anonymous data and assess the scope of the problem of 
stepparent abuse. The government has a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that the National Clearinghouse carries out its legislative 
mandate of preventing harm to minors.203 Since the statistical 
evidence indicates that the presence of stepparents presents a high 
risk, the statute is rationally related to that goal and would pass 
rational basis scrutiny. 
b. Proposed Risk Assessment Statute Under the Rational Basis 
Test 
The government has a compelling interest in protecting the 
safety of children.204 The Supreme Court has recognized that 
child abuse investigations are “in aid of and closely related to 
criminal statutes,” and law enforcement is a state interest.205 
                                                          
CHILD MALTREATMENT 1999, supra note 116, at 14 (providing a per capita 
abuse rate for victims by race). 
203 42 U.S.C. § 5105 (2002) (requiring the National Clearinghouse to 
carry out “an interdisciplinary program of research that is designed to provide 
information needed to better protect children from abuse or neglect”); see also 
Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d. at 814 (noting that Congress has delegated to the 
Census Bureau the authority to decide what is needed and to ask the 
appropriate questions). 
204 Osbourne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). “It is evident beyond the 
need for elaboration that a State’s ‘interest in safeguarding the physical and 
psychological well-being’ of a minor is ‘compelling.’” New York v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982). 
205 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (abstaining from hearing a case 
of an ongoing child abuse investigation at the state level). Although the focus 
of the Moore case is federalism, the Court’s language clearly shows deference 
to the state’s plenary power over individual interests absent unusual 
circumstances. Id. at 415. The state not only investigated a family suspected of 
child abuse, but took temporary custody of the children during the 
investigation. Id. The Court suggested that not “every attachment issued to 
protect a child, creates great, immediate and irreparable harm.” Id. at 417. 
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Although such a law may be both overinclusive (to the extent that 
it would disaffect some non-abusing stepparents) and 
underinclusive (to the extent that it would not target all abusers), 
this is not a significant factor under rational basis scrutiny.206 In 
addition, the proposal does not require a finding of abuse in 
stepparent families but merely contributes one more factor to an 
exhaustive list of factors relevant to child risks. Additionally, 
because “clear and convincing evidence” is constitutionally 
required to terminate the parental relationship, it is unlikely that 
this one factor would tip the scales in favor of a finding of abuse 
where none exists.207 This is especially true if caseworkers are 
more likely to err on the side of caution and report borderline 
cases as unsubstantiated.208 
c. Proposed Child Fatality Review Team Statute Under the 
Rational Basis Test 
The Proposed Child Fatality Review Team Statute also bears 
a rational relation to the legitimate state interest in crime 
prevention and detection.209 Although highly overinclusive and 
underinclusive, the statute is rationally related to the state’s 
interest if it can reasonably be perceived to have the potential to 
uncover undetected instances of abuse or prevent future abuse. 
                                                          
206 Beazer, 440 U.S. at 592. “Even if the classification involved here is to 
some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn 
by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this 
‘perfection is by no means required.’” Id. at 592 n.39, quoting Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979), quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas 
School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960).  
207  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 755 (1982) (setting the minimum 
standard for termination of parental rights under the Due Process Clause). 
208 See CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, supra note 123, at 25. The 
Commission noted that “the staff reductions led to less timely initiation of 
investigations, and the staff cuts and other budget cuts created incentives for 
workers to err on the side of failing to ‘found’ a report rather than refer the 
case for preventive services or foster care.” Id. 
209 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983) (noting that the state’s 
legitimate interest in crime prevention and detection is one factor in 
determining the reasonableness of a police search). 
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4. Other Proposals 
The preceding examples represent only three of the proposed 
legislative changes that might be considered when applying an 
evolutionary perspective to the current social problem of child 
abuse and stepparents. Professor Jones and other commentators 
have suggested a number of other proposals for receptive 
legislatures to consider in addressing the increased risk of abuse 
to children living with stepparents.210 Jones has not necessarily 
advocated any of these proposals but offers them as examples of 
the role evolutionary analysis can play in legal decision 
making.211 These proposals present considerations that can be 
divided into several categories. 
First, like the Proposed Data Collection Statute, several 
proposals would escape serious constitutional scrutiny altogether 
due to the legislature’s broad discretionary spending and fact-
finding powers. One such proposal is to increase funding for 
education of mandatory reporters and counseling to families at 
risk.212 Second, some proposals are more similar to the Proposed 
Risk Assessment and Proposed Child Fatality Review Team 
statutes, which directly disaffect stepparents. Those proposals 
would be subject to a similar equal protection analysis. These 
proposals include creating a separate legal standard for a 
stepparent’s right to discipline their children, creating deterrents 
                                                          
210 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2; Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 251 (2001) (assessing the risk of child sexual abuse at 
the hands of both biological parents and stepparents after divorce and 
suggesting legal interventions to mitigate the problem). 
211 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1233-35. 
212 Id. See also N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 418 (McKinney 2003). The 
statute defines “mandatory reporters” as: 
Any person or official required to report cases of suspected child 
abuse or maltreatment, including workers of the local child protective 
service, as well as an employee of or official of a state agency 
responsible for the investigation of a report of abuse or maltreatment 
of a child in residential care. 
Id. 
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through harsher punishment for non-related child abusers213 or 
providing a preference for biological parents in child custody 
determination.214 Third, consideration of biological influence on 
behavior can invigorate preexisting debate with a new 
perspective. Here, the constitutional implications are minor 
because the policy considerations would not rest solely on 
statistical evidence. For example, the subject of kinship care has 
been hotly debated.215 Kinship care, an alternative to traditional 
foster care, creates a preference for relatives of the parent.216 The 
debate is not currently centered around the best interest of the 
child but questions the wisdom of paying grandparents, uncles 
and aunts to care for their own relatives.217 As dangers to 
children living in a home absent biological relatives are more 
clearly defined, however, the best interest of the child may take a 
prominent role in the debate. Other proposals, such as making 
divorce more difficult when children are present in the family, is 
another example of a debate that could benefit from this 
discussion.218 Arguably, this could avoid the increased risk of 
                                                          
213 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1235. 
214 See Jones, Irrationality, supra note 56, at 311. Jones has suggested 
that behaviors that are biologically based may be more resistant to traditional 
methods of deterrence, such as imprisonment. Id. 
215 Gabrielle A. Paupeck, Note, When Grandma Becomes Mom: The 
Liberty Interests of Kinship Foster Care, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (2001) 
(arguing that kinship foster parents should have the same constitutional liberty 
interest in their wards as traditional nuclear family parents). 
216 Id. at 529. 
217 Id. at 535. 
218 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-808 (Michie 2001). Arkansas is 
one of three states, along with Arizona and Louisiana, that allow marrying 
couples to opt into a covenant marriage. Nicole Licata, Note, Should 
Premarital Counseling Be Mandatory as a Prerequisite to Obtaining a 
Marriage License, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 518, 525 (2001). “The covenant 
marriage enables couples to bind themselves to a stricter marital agreement 
than the traditional agreement.” Kimberly Miller, Survey of Legislation 2001 
General Assembly: Title 9: Family Law, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
483, 484 (2002). For dissolution of a covenant marriage in Arkansas, 
[T]he parties must prove one of the more egregious grounds for 
traditional divorces or live separate and apart for two years. If, 
however, the couple has a minor child of the marriage, then they 
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abuse to children after divorce altogether. Finally, Jones notes 
that some of these suggestions are admittedly absurd in our 
society but are nonetheless thought provoking.219 For example, 
one suggestion encourages single parents to marry their in-
laws.220 Like kinship care, a child whose mother marries her 
brother-in-law retains at least some biological connection to her 
                                                          
must first obtain a judgment of judicial separation and live apart 
continuously for two years and six months from the date of the 
judgment before seeking divorce. 
Id. at 484. Cf. Wilson, supra note 210, at 319 (noting that educating parents to 
the risks of sexual abuse to children after divorce may, for better or for worse, 
discourage divorce). 
[A]ny effort to raise awareness about the sexual vulnerability of girls 
following divorce will empower currently married parents to consider 
their options when making the decision whether to divorce. Arguably, 
society should not keep families in “blissful ignorance” simply 
because they may not react appropriately to information about this 
risk. 
Id. 
219 See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 2, at 1235. 
220 Id. As absurd as this suggestion may seem, several cultures have 
included marital preferences for relatives. See DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, 
supra note 27, at 85. Under the levirate custom of Talmudic law, when a man 
dies, his brother is given a right of marriage to the decedent’s wife. See, e.g., 
Deuteronomy 25:5 (King James). 
If bretheren dwell together, and one of them die, and have no child, 
the wife of the dead shall not marry, without unto a stranger: her 
husband’s brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, 
and perform the duty of an husband’s brother unto her. 
Id. This rule, however, would not protect stepchildren to childless widows. 
But see Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The 
Role of Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 509, 
540 (1998) (recognizing the levirate custom in some Native American cultures 
without a requirement that the widow be childless). Some Native American 
cultures also encourage sororal polygyny, the polygamous marriage of a man 
and two sisters. Id. at 539-40. In one of the few recorded polyandrous 
societies, women of the Tre-ba culture of Tibet often marry two brothers. 
DIAMOND, supra note 78, at 36. While the author cites the culture’s land 
tenure system of the Tre-ba as the reason for this practice, some evolutionary 
safeguards against stepparent abuse are nonetheless present to children in Tre-
ba families because their nonparental caretakers are closely related. Id. 
